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I. INTRODUCTION
Police officers throughout the nation face the practical applica-
tion of Fourth Amendment' protections in the automobile investiga-
1. U.S. Const., Amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
reads: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
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tory stop context daily in a wide variety of settings.2 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has yet to articulate a functional analytical approach
to automobile investigatory stops. 3  This lack of guidance is
particularly troublesome when one considers that the Framers
specifically designed the Fourth Amendment to prevent government
officials from conducting investigations in an oppressive, unreasonable
manner. 4 The problem is not simply theoretical but has manifested
itself through confusion in the lower courts. The lack of response from
the Court on this issue has left lower courts not only disagreeing over
the appropriate approach courts should use to analyze the pretext
issue but also questioning the existence and content of pretext
doctrine. 5
2. The Supreme Court noted over a quarter of a century ago that "[s]treet encounters
between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich in diversity ... [and] are initiated by the
police for a wide variety of purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to prosecute
for crime." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968) (holding that a police officer's reasonable suspicion
justifies a temporary detention). Although Terry involved the stopping of a pedestrian, the same
variety and diversity is present in vehicle stops. See Wayne R. LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure: A
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.3 at 423 n.3 (West, 2d ed. 1987) ("Search and Seizure").
Any police-initiated stop of an automobile, including a simple traffic stop, clearly constitutes a
limited seizure under the Fourth Amendment and falls within the purview of Terry. See United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (holding that the police must have a reasonable suspicion of
a traffic violation to justify a routine traffic stop); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226
(1985); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 4 n.3 (1980); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663
(1979).
3. United States v. Cuminins, 920 F.2d 498, 501 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that the Supreme
Court has not decided this issue directly). Although the Supreme Court has stated clearly that
the Terry v. Ohio reasonable suspicion standard applies to vehicle stops, see Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979) (holding warrantless, random traffic stops unconstitutional), the Court never
has addressed the issue of pretextual stops of motorists directly and has given conflicting signals
as to whether pretextual activity is unconstitutional. See United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037,
1039 (7th Cir. 1989) (commenting that the Court's response to the pretext problem is ambiguous).
See also Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349,
414 (1974) (stating that "the Supreme-Court has never found . . . any legal mechanisms for
controlling police activities" in the area of investigatory stops).
4. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 147 (1925). See also Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century?
A Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 Temple
L. Rev. 221, 222 (1989); Ed Aro, Note, The Pretext Problem Revisited: A Doctrinal Exploration of
Bad Faith in Search and Seizure Cases, 70 B.U. L. Rev. 111, 111 n.4 (1990). For thorough
discussions of the background and development of the Fourth Amendment, see Salken, 62 Temple
L. Rev. at 254-56; Lawrence A. Brenner and Michal R. Belknap, Police Practices and the Bill of
Rights, in David J. Bodenhamer and James W. Ely, Jr., The Bill of Rights in Modern America:
After 200 Years 122-30 (Indiana U., 1993).
5. Compare United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1516-17 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding that
numerous Supreme Court cases recognize that a pretextual use of police power is unreasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment), with United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1039
(7th Cir. 1989) (stating that "the Court has not defined the contours of a pretextual arrest and has
never excluded evidence as the product of a pretextual seizure"). See also notes 27-43 and
accompanying text; Salken, 62 Temple L. Rev. at 240 (stating that "[ilt is not clear whether the
Supreme Court views searches or seizures as illegal just because an officer's reasons for using a
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Although commentators debate the breadth and scope of pre-
textual searches and seizures,6 a fairly accepted definition is that a
search or seizure is pretextual if it is performed by police officers at
least partially for reasons different than the justifications later offered
by the government.7 Thus, pretextual activity is conduct by police
that seems objectively reasonable and that prosecutors later seek tojustify by a valid Fourth Amendment theory consistent with the
objective appearance, but actually is done for constitutionally invalid
reasons. 8 Pretextual investigatory stops lie at the very heart of the
pretext issue. A pretextual investigatory stop occurs when police use
a valid justification to stop a vehicle to search for evidence of an
unrelated crime, for which the police do not have the reasonable
suspicion necessary to permit the stop. 9 How the Supreme Court
should resolve the pretextual activity issue has generated a great
diversity of views.'0
Commentators have failed to offer a comprehensive yet
functional solution that fully incorporates the competing policies of
Fourth Amendment protections and crime-fighting effectiveness with
judicial and law enforcement realities. Therefore, this Note attempts
specific fourth amendment power on a particular occasion are not the reasons advanced by courts
for approving the doctrine which allows such fourth amendment activity").
This Note does not intend to analyze the commentary on the pretext doctrine; rather, it is an
analysis of the federal circuit court cases interpreting the Supreme Court's guidance on this issue
and a distillation of a functional approach to investigatory stop cases. Thus, this Note does not
focus on the presence or lack of a pretext doctrine. It discusses that doctrine from the standpoint
of existing case law as it bears on the development of a cohesive approach to Fourth Amendment
investigatory stop cases. Nevertheless, the pretext doctrine has generated much discussion
recently. See, for example, David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 465 (1992); Edwin J. Butterfoss, Solving the Pretext Puzzle: The
Importance of Ulterior Motives and Fabrications in the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
Pretext Doctrine, 79 Ky. L. J. 1, (1990-91); Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by
Administrative Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth
Amendment Adjudication, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 442 (1990).
6. Compare James B. Haddad, Pretextual Fourth Amendment Activity: Another Viewpoint,
18 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 639, 643 (1985) (stating that "a pretextual [seizure] is in issue only if the
officer acts within the legal boundaries of a fourth amendment doctrine"), with Daniel S. Jonas,
Comment, Pretext Searches and the Fourth Amendment: Unconstitutional Abuses of Power, 137
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1791, 1802-03 (1989) (implicitly defining situations involving legally sufficient and
insufficient justifications for a seizure as pretexts).
7. Butterfoss, 79 Ky. L. J. at 1 (cited in note 5). Butterfoss noted that "[clommentators
typically define pretext as a situation where the government offers a justification for the activity
that, if the motivation of the officer is not considered, would be a legally sufficient justification for
the activity.' Id. at I n.1.
8. See Haddad, 18 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. at 641-43 (cited in note 6). Indeed, one writer has
noted that "investigatory activity is by far the most troubling aspect of the pretext problem." Aro,
Note, 70 B.U. L. Rev. at 111 n.4 (cited in note 4).
9. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988). For the definition of
reasonable suspicion, see text accompanying note 126.
10. See notes 43-70 and accompanying text.
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to offer a more functional approach that satisfies Fourth Amendment
concerns while still providing police officers with a useful framework
with which to gauge their conduct. Moreover, this Note urges the
Supreme Court to determine the proper judicial inquiry to be made
when reviewing the validity of an investigatory stop."
While attempting to offer a resolution, this Note acknowledges
the complexity of devising effective Fourth Amendment controls in
this area. Fashioning legal mechanisms for guiding police activities,
particularly constitutionally based legal mechanisms, has been
difficult even for the Supreme Court. -1 2 One reason for this difficulty is
the pervasiveness of discretion given to police regarding decisions they
make on the job.13  Because of this discretion, one commentator has
implied that some people might relegate Fourth Amendment
protections to a position of importance below law enforcement realities
simply because of the futility of establishing legal requirements. 14 The
need to give effect to the protections articulated in the Fourth
Amendment, however, outweighs the difficult challenge to devise
effective Fourth Amendment controls in this area. 15 This Note takes
11. Indeed, one Supreme Court Justice has recognized the need to address this issue.
Although the Court denied certiorari in three cases presenting this issue, Cummins v. United
States, 112 S. Ct. 428 (1991), Trigg v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 428 (1991), and Enriquez-Nevarez
v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 429 (1991), Justice White, dissenting from the denials of the petitions,
remarked: "I would grant certiorari to address this recurring issue and to resolve the split in the
Courts of Appeals." Id. at 429. The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits have
faced this issue since 1987, with the District of Columbia Circuit addressing it in 1991 and the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits addressing it in 1993. See Part IV of this Note. The split of authority
on this issue is clear. Of the circuits that have addressed this issue, seven have adopted the
purely objective test, see notes 28-31 and accompanying text; two courts have adopted the
modified objective test, see notes 32-37 and accompanying text; and the Ninth Circuit has adopted
a subjective intent standard. See United States v. Huffhines, 967 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 1986). Note that the Sixth Circuit, which
had adopted (and consistently applied) the modified objective test, recently muddied the waters
by rejecting both the modified objective and the purely objective tests and adopting a probable
cause standard. See United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 1993) (en banc). Additionally,
many federal courts have faced this issue since 1992 alone. See, for example, Ferguson, 8 F.3d
385; United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Horn, 970 F.2d 728
(10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Richards, 967 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Gutierrez-Mederos, 965 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1992). Finally, commentators also argue that the
Supreme Court must address this issue. See, for example, Rudovsky, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
at 479-80 (cited in note 5) (stating that 'if deterring police misconduct is a principal purpose of the
Court's Fourth Amendment doctrine .... pretextual arrests.., should be classic candidates for
strong remedial action" and that "[i]f the courts do not address deliberate [police] misconduct, it is
unrealistic to believe that other institutions will respond").
12. Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at 414-15 (cited in note 3).
13. Id. at 415.
14. Id. (espousing administrative rulemaking an effective safeguard against arbitrariness in
searches and seizures).
15. This Note does not imply that courts do not give effect to the Fourth Amendment. The
Supreme Court and lower courts consistently have given effect to Fourth Amendment principles.
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up that challenge and develops a test that cohesively joins Fourth
Amendment protections with the realities of law enforcement, and
that the courts can implement to provide a workable solution to this
question.
Part II of this Note gives an overview of pretextual investi-
gatory stops and, more importantly, why they pose a problem. This
Part also explains the tests adopted by the federal circuit courts. Part
III reviews the backdrop of Supreme Court guidance on this issue.
Part IV then analyzes the reasoning of the circuit courts that have ad-
dressed this issue. Part V discusses the competing policies affecting
judicial review options. Part VI then uses the analyses in Parts II
through V-the tests of the circuit courts and their reasoning, the
Supreme Court guidance, and the competing policies-to develop a
functional framework that embodies the balancing approach
inherently mandated by the Fourth Amendment.16 In its conclusion,
this Note urges the Supreme Court to take up this issue, offering that
a functional approach, such as the multipart test recommended in
Part VI, is not only possible but also desirable to promote reasonable
police procedures while giving effect to Fourth Amendment principles.
II. THE PROBLEM
A. Framing the Issue
Suppose that a person anonymously tipped the police that the
identity of a sought-after bank robber was C.1' The police, knowing
that they lack probable cause to arrest and interrogate C, search for a
way to justify apprehending and interrogating him. 's Then, they
fortuitously discover an outstanding warrant for C's arrest issued
years earlier when C failed to appear in court to answer a petty theft
See, for example, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding that 'persons in
automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy
interfered with at the unbridled discretion of police officers"). Rather, this Note argues that the
standard selected by courts to judge the validity of investigatory stops directly affects the level of
strength afforded those Fourth Amendment protections. Because circuit courts disagree on the
proper standard to apply to automobile investigatory stops, similarly situated defendants will
receive varying degrees of Fourth Amendment protection based on the jurisdiction in which they
are tried.
16. See Aro, Note, 70 B.U. L. Rev. at 123 n.76 (cited in note 4).
17. The facts of this hypothetical are taken from United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179,
1180 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
18. Id.
1994]
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charge. 19 The police verify the warrant's continued validity with the
judge who issued the warrant and then arrest C, who later confesses
to robbing the bank.20 At the hearing on Cs motion to suppress the
confession due to the pretextual motive of the arrest, one of the
involved police officers states that their only reason for arresting C on
the warrant was to investigate the bank robbery.1 On these facts, a
panel of the Fifth Circuit ruled that the exclusive motive to question
the defendant, Mr. Reginald Causey, about the robbery rendered the
arrest for the misdemeanor pretextual and tainted his confession,
making it inadmissible.22 On rehearing, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en
banc, disagreed with its own panel on both its reasoning and
interpretation of authority, reversing the decision and permitting the
admission of the confession.2
United States v. Causey exemplifies various aspects of the
pretext problem. First, it illustrates that pretextual activity of police
searching for a reason to justify an arrest or stop of is a reality of law




22. United States v. Causey, 818 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1987).
23. Causey, 834 F.2d at 1180.
24. Police abuse of discretionary power is a reality. The highly publicized beating of Rodney
King by Los Angeles police officers is perhaps the best illustration of the reality of police abuse of
power. See Rudovsky, 27 Hrv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 466-67 (cited in note 5). Judge Kozinski of
the Ninth Circuit, reflecting on the King incident, stated that "for a lot of naive people, including
me, [the King incident] puts a real doubt on the posture of prosecutors that police are
disinterested civil servants just 'telling it as it is.' We should have known all along what this
incident points out: that police get involved in what they do and that they are participants in the
process just like anyone else. They are subject to bias and they do have a stake in the outcome."
Darlene Ricker, Behind the Silence, 77 A.B.A. J. 45, 48 (July 1991).
Moreover, two relatively recent cases confirm that pretextual activity by police officers is
occurring specifically in the context of automobile investigatory stops. See United States v.
Daniel, 804 F. Supp. 1330 (D. Nev. 1992); Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
In Daniel, officers were engaged in "gang suppression" activities when they stopped the
automobile in which the defendant was riding. Daniel, 804 F. Supp. at 1332. The officers had
followed a known gang member, and one officer testified that the officers would have used any
traffic infraction, however slight, as an excuse to stop the car. Id. at 1335. The district court held
that the stop was not principally a routine traffic stop because the officers were engaged in "gang
suppression" and not traffic control at the time of the stop. The court thus held that the traffic
violation was no more than a pretext to stop the automobile and subject the defendant to a search
and interrogation for which the officers had neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion. Id.
at 1336.
In Garcia, two officers observed the defendant's Cadillac in front of a suspected drug
residence. Garcia, 827 S.W.2d at 938. The officers later observed the same Cadillac at an
intersection and decided to follow the car. The officers saw the Cadillac pass through the next
intersection without stopping at the posted stop sign. They decided to stop the car for the traffic
violation. Id. After the defendant attempted to flee, the officers discovered that the defendant
possessed cocaine. Id. at 939. The defendant appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress the evidence based on the pretextual motive of the officers. Id. at 938. In upholding the
denial of the motion, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals discarded the subjective intent test it
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this doctrine has engendered, even between a circuit court sitting en
banc and its own panel.25 Third, the case raises the question of
whether pretextual police activity is truly wrong considering the
perspectives of both society and the defendant, and if wrong, why the
law should regard it as S0.26
B. The Confusion Manifested: A Substantial Split
A substantial split of authority among the federal circuit courts
reflects the confusion surrounding the issue of pretextual
investigatory stops. 27  At least seven federal circuit courts have
adopted the purely objective test.28 The Causey court enunciated this
had adopted five years earlier, primarily because a majority of the federal circuit courts had
adopted either an objective or modified objective test for pretext stops. Id. at 942. Indeed, one
commentator has noted that "[r]arely will an officer be deterred from pretextual arrests or
searches because of the remote chance that a court might find that activity illegal." Salken, 62
Temple L. Rev. at 241-42 (cited in note 4).
25. The members of the Fifth Circuit sitting for the rehearing of Causey included 13 of the
14 judges who were circuit judges at the time the court's panel initially heard the case. Compare
Fifth Circuit, Circuit Judges, 818 F.2d XV (1987), and Causey, 834 F.2d at 1179-80. Interestingly,
another circuit court siting en banc has disagreed with one of its own panels regarding this issue.
See United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 1993) (arguably adopting the purely objective
test), which overruled United States v. Ferguson, 989 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1993) (applying a
modified objective test, which the circuit had previously adopted). See note 244.
26. See Part lI.D.
27. United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 887 (4th Cir. 1992) (Luttig, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (stating that "[t]here is a substantial
split in the circuits over whether a lawful investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio... can ever be
unconstitutional because of the subjective intentions of the investigating officer"). Indeed, one
commentator, referring to the purely objective test and the modified objective test, has stated
that federal appellate courts have developed "two dramatically different tests" and termed the
purely objective test a "radically different interpretation [than the modified objective test] of the
same Supreme Court precedents." Loren Keith Newman, Comment, Horton v. California:
Searching for a Good Cause, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 455, 467-68 (1991) (emphasis added). See also
note 11.
28. United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Mitchell,
951 F.2d 1291, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501 (8th Cir. 1990);
United States v. THgg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d
1179, 1182 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc); United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1316 (2d Cir.
1987); United States v..Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 213 (3d Cir. 1987). Although the First Circuit
clearly has rejected a subjective test, it has not clarified whether it will apply the purely objective
test or the modified objective test. See United States v. Hadfield, 918 F.2d 987, 993 (1st Cir. 1990)
(stating that "[i]t is a bedrock premise of fourth amendment jurisprudence that an officer's state
of mind or subjective intent in conducting a search is inapposite as long as the circumstances,
viewed objectively, justify the action taken"). Arguably, the First Circuit also has adopted the
purely objective test. see United States v. McCambridge, 551 F.2d 865, 870 (lst Cir. 1977), but
because McCambridge was decided before the Supreme Court's more recent relevant holdings on
this issue, see notes 109-36 and accompanying text, precisely where the First Circuit actually
would fall regarding this issue is unclear. Finally, note that the Sixth Circuit, which recently
adopted what it called a 'probable cause" investigatory stop standard, arguably also has adopted
the purely objective test. United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 396 (6th Cir. 1993) (en banc)
(Keith, J., dissenting).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
test, stating that "so long as police do no more than they are
objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in
doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry."29 This test is
based on the view that if police officers have acted in ways the law
objectively allows, their subjective motives are not relevant to the
evidence suppression inquiry because the purpose of the exclusionary
rule is to deter unlawful police actions; therefore, courts should not
apply the exclusionary rule when the police have done nothing
objectively unlawful.3° The circuit courts that have adopted the purely
objective test have found explicitly that this inquiry stems directly
from Supreme Court decisions.3'
Conversely, two circuit courts have adopted the modified
objective test,3 2  which originated in United States v. Smith.33  In
Smith, the Eleventh Circuit held that a state trooper's stop of the
defendant's car to investigate possible drug activity was pretextual
when the trooper: (1) determined the vehicle matched a drug courier
profile merely because it was being driven cautiously, (2) thought it
was suspicious that the defendant did not look at the trooper's police
car as the defendant passed, and (3) proceeded to follow the vehicle
before the defendant exhibited any suspicious activity.34 In analyzing
the validity of the trooper's action, the court formulated the test that
the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits since have adopted, concluding that
"in determining when an investigatory stop is unreasonably
pretextual, the proper inquiry . . . is not whether the officer could
validly have made the stop but whether under the same
circumstances a reasonable officer would have made the stop in the
absence of the invalid purpose. . . .35 These courts readily
29. Causey, 834 F.2d at 1184.
30. Id. at 1185.
31. Id. at 1183-84 (stating that "the [Supreme] Court has told us that where police officers
are objectively doing what they are legally authorized to do... the results of their investigations
are not to be called in question on the basis of any subjective intent with which they acted") (citing
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978), United States v. Villamonte.Marquez, 462 U.S. 579
(1983), and Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S 463 (1985)); Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1040 (stating that '[m]ost
circuits . . . have interpreted [the Supreme Court's] language as dictating a purely objective
inquiry in evaluating the reasonableness of a particular police activity") (citing the same Supreme
Court cases).
32. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Smith,
799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 1986). See also United States v. Valdez, 931 F.2d 1448 (11th Cir.
1991). Some courts call this test the Smith test after the Eleventh Circuit case that originally
formulated the test: however, to prevent confusion, this Note refers to this test as the "modified
objective test."
33. 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986).
34. Id. at 706-07.
35. Id. at 709-10 (emphasis in original) (reasoning, "[iln its focus on objective reasonableness
rather than on subjective intent or theoretical possibility, that this standard is fully consistent
with Supreme Court precedent for determining the validity of a Terry-stop). Interestingly, six
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acknowledge that the appropriate analysis of the facts and
circumstances of a pretextual stop is an objective one rather than an
inquiry into an officer's subjective intent. They disagree with those
courts following the purely objective test, however, regarding the
objective elements that are dispositive in examining whether a
pretextual seizure or search is unconstitutional. 6 The courts following
the modified objective test reason that this test is proper because it
provides useful judicial review of discretionary police actions while
still preserving the requirement of an objective inquiry into Fourth
Amendment activity.37
The confusion generated by this issue also reaches to the appli-
cation of these standards. The Fourth Circuit recently decided a case
in which the defendant argued for the adoption of the modified objec-
tive test.38 The government argued that the court should follow the
purely objective test instead. The majority, however, delayed deciding
between the two tests because it found that the initial stop of the
defendant's vehicle was constitutional under either approach.3 9 Spe-
cifically, it found that the district court did not err in its determination
that a reasonable officer would have stopped the defendant's vehicle.40
Judge Luttig, however, argued that the two standards would yield
different results on review because adopting the modified objective
standard would require the court to remand the case for factual
findings on whether a reasonable officer would have stopped the
defendant's vehicle while the purely objective standard automatically
would yield a valid investigatory stop.41 He thus concluded that the
court had to address the question of which standard to adopt and
found that the purely objective standard was "all but dictated" by
Supreme Court decisions. 2
months after Smith, the Eleventh Circuit decided that another drug courier profile stop,
conducted by the same officer who conducted the stop in Smith, also was made on less than
reasonable suspicion. Onited States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546 (1lth Cir. 1987). The court applied
the test adopted in Smith and struck down the stop as pretextual because the court determined
that a reasonable officer would not have stopped the defendant for crossing the highway lane
marker by four inches for approximately six seconds. Id. at 547, 549.
36. See, for example, Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1515.
37. See, for example, id. at 1517.
38. United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 876 (4th Cir. 1992).
39. Id. The Fourth Circuit recently adopted the purely objective standard in United States
v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 1993). See notes 215-22 and accompanying text.
40. Rusher, 966 F.2d at 876.
41. Id. at 886-87 (Luttig, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
42. Id. at 887-88.
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C. Alternative Analytical Frameworks: More Confusion
Contributing significantly to the problem regarding
interpretation of the Supreme Court's pretext doctrine is the fact that
the doctrine is very ambiguous and, therefore, very difficult for lower
courts to follow.43 In response, commentators have generated varied
analytical frameworks that have attempted to paint a cohesive
doctrinal picture from the views of the pretext doctrine that the
Supreme Court has displayed. Perhaps the two most notable
constructs are those of Professors Burkoff and Haddad. 44 Professors
Butterfoss and LaFave also have set forth comprehensive
explanations of how the Supreme Court's pretext doctrine cases mesh
together.45 An in-depth review and analysis of these constructs is well
beyond the scope of this Note. To build a functional Fourth
Amendment investigatory stop doctrine, however, requires an
understanding of at least the basic concepts of these frameworks.
Professor Burkoff asserts that Supreme Court cases holding
that any subjective proof of pretext is irrelevant and that only an
objective analysis is necessary severely weaken individual Fourth
Amendment protections available under the pretext search doctrine.4
Burkoff nevertheless believes that the Court's objective analysis
simply asks whether any evidence of pretextual activity existed and, if
present, holds that the activity is per se unconstitutional.47 Burkoff
argues, however, that under the pretext doctrine, "pretextual activity
is plainly unconstitutional and courts must strike down this activity
when presented with sufficient evidence, either objective or subjective,
of an improper motive.48 Burkoff believes that, since Colorado v.
Bertine, the Court examines the individual subjective motivation of a
police officer on a case-by-case basis and strikes down activity that it
43. See United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1039 (7th Cir. 1989) (commenting that the
Supreme Court's response to the pretext problem is ambiguous). See also note 5 and
accompanying text. Indeed, one commentator has noted that "the Court's jurisprudence on
pretext arrests provides incentives to the police to violate or avoid basic constitutional
guarantees." Rudovsky, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 479 (cited in note 5).
44. See John M. Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine Returns After Never Leaving, 66 U.
Detroit L. Rev. 363 (1989); John M. Burkoff, Rejoinder. Truth, Justice, and the American
Way-Or Professor Haddad's "Hard Choices", 18 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 695 (1985); Haddad, 18 U.
Mich. J. L. Ref. at 641-43 (cited in note 6); John M. Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now
You See It, Now You Don't, 17 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 523 (1984).
45. Butterfoss. 79 Ky. L. J. 1 (cited in note 5); LaFave, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at 442 (cited in note
5).
46. See Burkoff, 17 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. at 523-36 (cited in note 44).
47. See id.
48. See Burkoff, 18 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. at 699-703 (cited in note 44).
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finds pretextual.49 The problem with Burkoffs construct of the pretext
doctrine, however, is that it does not comport with Supreme Court
precedent2 nor does his "plainly unconstitutional" test take into
account the underlying policy of the Fourth Amendment, which is to
balance the governmental need to perform an investigatory stop with
the privacy rights of the individual.51
Professor Haddad, however, comments that the Supreme Court
considers the possibility that a certain act is vulnerable to use as a
pretext by police officers as just one of the factors used in determining
whether the police activity comports with the Fourth Amendment.52
He suggests that the Court then upholds, strikes down, or restricts the
police power based on all the facts.- The Court performs this analysis
instead of examining the subjective intent of the officer because if the
officer only does what the law allows him to do, then the officer's
conduct is valid under the Fourth Amendment.64 Haddad's position,
however, cannot be reconciled with the proposition that the officer's
motive may become relevant after a court determines that the Fourth
Amendment was violated.55 Moreover, the Supreme Court also has
held that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable when an officer's good
faith belief that a defective warrant was valid was objectively
reasonable.5 Finally, the Eighth Circuit has held that if a court finds
49. See Burkoff, 66 U. Detroit L. Rev. at 395-408 (cited in note 44) (discussing Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987)).
50. See notes 110-36 and accompanying text. See also Butterfoss, 79 Ky. L. J. at 7-11 (cited
in note 5).
51. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221; 228 (1985) (stating, "The proper way to
identify the limits [on investigatory stops to investigate past criminal activity] is to apply the
same test already used to identify the proper bounds of intrusions that further investigations of
imminent or ongoing crimes. That test, which is grounded in the standard of reasonableness
embodied in the Fourth Amendment, balances the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal
security against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.");
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 591-93 (1983) (balancing the need to enforce
sea-going vessel registration statutes by inspections against the intrusion engendered by the
inspections); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655-61 (1979) (balancing the intrusion imposed on
the occupants of a vehicle by a random stop to check documents with the marginal contribution to
roadway safety potentially resulting from the spot checks); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128,
139-41 (1978) (balancing. the amount of wiretapping necessary to provide law enforcement officials
with means to combat crime against the infringement on individual privacy caused when the
electronic surveillance is not minimized); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555-64
(1976) (balancing the need to enforce immigration laws against the intrusion caused by brief
vehicle stops at the nation's borders).
52. Haddad, 18 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. at 651-52 (cited in note 6).
53. Id. at 652.
54. Id. at 687.
55. See Scott, 436 U.S. at 139 n.13 (stating: 'On occasion, the motive with which the officer
conducts an illegal search may have some relevance in determining the propriety of applying the
exclusionary rule .... This focus on intent, however, becomes relevant only after it has been
determined that the Constitution was in fact violated.").
56. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-25 (1984).
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the Fourth Amendment was violated, then it may consider the officer's
state of mind to decide if it should apply the exclusionary rule.51
Haddad's construct, which analyzes the validity of the police power
alone, thus does not fit cleanly within Supreme Court precedent or
circuit court interpretations of that precedent.
To explain the Supreme Court's approach to the pretext issue,
Professor Butterfoss distinguishes between legal pretexts and
fabricated pretexts.5 Legal pretextual stops are those in which a
police officer has a pretextual motive for performing the investigatory
stop but has a legal basis for performing the stop-such as a minor
traffic offense. 59 Fabricated pretexts, however, involve pretextual
stops in which the police officer lies about a violation by the
automobile operator to provide the justification for the officer's illegal
activity.60  Professor Butterfoss states that the Court's current
approach is to find legal pretexts constitutional but to perform a case-
by-case analysis when the pretext is fabricated.61 Although Professor
Butterfoss views this construct as close to the correct approach, he
nevertheless contends that the Court should re-examine the
underlying authority to arrest based on minor offenses.62 He also
suggests that a new approach to fabricated pretexts still may be
necessary because of the difficulty of proving fabrication of a pretext
on a case-by-case basis.63 He recommends that the modified objective
test be applied to fabricated pretext cases. 64
57. United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501 n.3 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing Scott, 436 U.S.
at 139 n.13).
58. Butterfoss, 79 Ky. L. J. at 5-6 (cited in note 5).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 6 (stating that "[i] n a fabricated pretext, the government offers a justification that
is not the true reason for the police activity and, in fact, is legally insufficient because it is not
supported by the facts").
61. Id. at 54.
62. Id. at 7 (concluding that "an approach that... reexamines the underlying authority of
police officers to arrest and search based on a minor offense, offers the better solution to the
'pretext problem'"). Professor Butterfoss is not alone in his recommendation that the Supreme
Court reexamine the authority to arrest based on minor offenses. Professor LaFave has stated
that "the proposition that the [F]ourth [A]mendment should be construed to bar custodial arrests
for minor violations is an appealing one." LaFave, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at 487 (cited in note 5). See
also Salken, 62 Temple L. Rev. at 252-73 (cited in note 4) (asserting that the Fourth Amendment
limits the power to arrest for traffic violations). Finally, the State of Florida specifically has
decriminalized traffic violations, prescribing civil penalties for them, thereby not permitting a
search incident to arrest for minor traffic violations. See Thomas v. State, 614 S.2d 468 (Fla.
1993) (holding that a police officer should not have used an arrest of a bicyclist, based on his
operation of the bicycle without a bell or gong in violation of a city ordinance, to conduct a full
search incident to arrest).
63. Butterfoss, 79 Ky. L. J. at 54 (cited in note 5).




Professor Butterfoss's view of the pretext doctrine, although
helpful in adding cohesiveness to the Court's holdings, is problematic.
The approach requires a court to determine initially whether a
pretextual stop was legal or fabricated; it then applies either a per se
holding of validity if the pretext was legal or the modified objective
test if it was fabricated. This differentiation, however, quickly could
become innocuous because, as Butterfoss himself notes, courts have a
natural reluctance to question the honesty of officers,65 and thus, the
courts rarely would find fabricated pretexts. It logically follows that
Butterfoss's construct would yield a Fourth Amendment investigatory
stop doctrine that would be doctrinally similar to the purely objective
test because the courts simply would look to see if a valid reason to
stop existed and, if so, would declare the stop valid as a legal pretext.
Only in the rare instance of egregious facts clearly contrary to an
officer's statements would a court consider applying the modified
objective test. This construct draws the line between legal and
fabricated pretextual stops so far toward the fabricated pretext side
that courts would declare few pretextual stops fabricated. Thus,
Professor Butterfoss's construct is no more helpful in resolving this
issue than the confusion that already exists among the courts.
Finally, Professor LaFave propounds judicial review of police
rules as a means to protect Fourth Amendment guarantees. 66 LaFave
comments that the combination of tremendous complexity and discre-
tion in the Fourth Amendment activities of police strongly suggests a
need for guidelines regulating this type of police activity.67 LaFave
asserts that the Supreme Court should stimulate police rulemaking by
reviewing challenged police rules. This judicial review, he contends,
will encourage the police to produce written law enforcement policies
and continuously subject these policies to a critical re-evaluation proc-
ess.68 The benefits gained by this judicial approach include: (1) the
enhanced quality of police -policy decisions, (2) the fair and equal
treatment of citizens, (3) the increased visibility of police department
decisions, and (4) the increased consistency of police in obeying and
65. Id. at 55. Indeed, American courts routinely give deference to police officers'
determinations of reasonable suspicion. See, for example, United States v. Johnson, 862 F.2d
1135, 1136-37, 1140 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that deference is appropriate when circumstances
justify search and seizure of drug trafficking suspects).
66. See LaFave, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at 442 (cited in note 5).
67. Id. at 442-45. LaFave concludes that "[gliven the complex and discretionary character
of police search and seizure decisions, some limitations on this power are essential." Id. at 445.
68. Id. at 446 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect into
Custody 513 (Little, Brown, 1967)).
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enforcing constitutional norms. 6 9 Although these benefits certainly
justify implementing judicial review of police guidelines, two criticisms
of Professor LaFave's approach arise. First, even if the courts are
better suited to review, rather than develop, police procedures, 70 the
courts themselves still must have some standard by which to approve
or disapprove the rules developed by the police. Therefore, the courts
still must determine what minimum policy guidelines are necessary to
protect Fourth Amendment guarantees. Second, judicial review of
police guidelines may become the focus of a case to the extent that the
police are "on trial" for the guidelines they have or have not developed,
rather than the defendant's charge that the police activity violated his
Fourth Amendment rights.
D. What's Wrong with Pretextual Stops Anyway?
Who is harmed by a pretextual investigatory stop? Society at
large? The defendant? If so, how are they harmed? Do the benefits of
permitting pretextual activity outweigh the costs of that activity?
Does society require a check on the discretionary power of our police
authorities or is the discretionary power to perform investigatory
stops necessary in the sometimes overwhelming fight against crime?
The answers to these questions go to the foundation of the issue of
what test courts should apply to ensure that investigatory stops
comport with Fourth Amendment requirements.
That the Fourth Amendment prohibits arbitrary searches and
seizures as well as unjustified searches and seizures is well settled7 1
The Framers included the warrant requirement in that amendment to
accomplish both purposes.72  Some searches and seizures, however,
including investigatory stops, qualify as exceptions to the warrant
requirement and thus do not require a warrant to issue before the
search or seizure is conducted.7 3  Nevertheless, society considers
indiscriminate searches and seizures harmful because they expose
people and their possessions to intrusions by government officials who
may act arbitrarily and capriciously in exercising their search and
seizure powers.7 4
69. LaFave, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at 451 (cited in note 5) (citing Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at
423-28 (cited in note 3)).
70. See LaFave, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at 449 (cited in note 5).
71. Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at 417 (cited in note 3).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 414. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
74. Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at 411 (cited in note 3). See also William J. Mertens, The
Fourth Amendment and the Control of Police Discretion, 17 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 551, 561-63 (1984).
Compare Rudovsky, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 467 (cited in note 5) (observing that "[i]n the
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These purported harms may be damaging to the ideal of a free
society. Modern police practices are almost entirely discretionary.75
In his now well-known lecture, Professor Amsterdam remarked that
whether a person is arrested and searched or sent on her way with a
ticket after a minor traffic infraction depends on the mental, physical,
or emotional state of any officer who stops the person or, more
realistically, on the subjective dislikes of an officer, such as the price of
the person's automobile or the color of the person's skin.76  As a
counterweight to the unbridled use of police power to which Professor
Amsterdam referred, the Supreme Court consistently has interpreted
the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and
seizures to require the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained in
criminal trials.77
Supreme Court rulings make it evident that arbitrary automo-
bile investigatory stops may be unreasonable within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment,78 and thus detrimental to the societal free-
dom the Framers intended to protect. The Court, concerned with the
evil of standardless and unconstrained discretion, has held that the
risk of arbitrary and abusive police conduct exceeds permissible limits
when an investigatory stop is not based on objective criteria;79
therefore, the discretion of the field official must be limited.c° Indeed,
the Tenth Circuit has observed that the need to restrict the arbitrary
use of police discretion was the impetus for Supreme Court decisions
United States there is both a fear of governmental abuse and a tolerance of repressive measures,
the latter reflecting a belief that police excesses are necessary to combat crime").
75. Amsterdam, 58 Min. L. Rev. at 415 (cited in note 3). See also Rudovsky, 27 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. at 469 (cited in note 5) (stating that "the Supreme Court has drastically limited the
substantive protections of the Fourth Amendment and has significantly narrowed the
exclusionary rule, thus authorizing increasingly invasive police searches, seizures, and other
investigative practices"); Salken, 62 Temple L. Rev. at 222 (cited in note 4) (observing that "police
officers in most states may arrest and search virtually every adult almost at whim").
76. Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at 416 (cited in note 3).
77. The Court established the doctrine of excluding evidence obtained from an unreasonable
search or seizure in federal criminal trials was in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), in
which the Supreme Court held that, as applied in federal criminal litigation, the Fourth
Amendment imposes an exclusionary sanction for the purpose of enforcing the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. See generally John
William Strong, ed., McCormick on Evidence § 166 at 288 (West, 4th ed. 1992). One commentator
even has stated that the exclusionary sanction "prevents the system from functioning as an
unmitigated inducement to policemen to violate the fourth amendment on every occasion when
there is criminal evidence to be gained by doing so." Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at 431 (cited in
note 3). But compare Rudovsky, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 469 (cited in note 5) (stating that
the Supreme Court -has significantly narrowed the exclusionary rule").
78. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
79. Brown. 443 U.S. at 52. See also Rudovsky, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 479 (cited in
note 5) (assuming that "deterring police misconduct is a principal purpose of the Court's Fourth
Amendment doctrine").
80. Prouse. 440 U.S. at 661.
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prohibiting police practices not subject to objective review.81 Thus, the
Court implicitly has recognized that society's interest in freedom from
unreasonable intrusions by police officers would be harmed by
allowing arbitrary or unjustified investigatory stops. 82
The plight of the individual defendant who is denied a
suppression motion because the stop of her vehicle was reasonable
under the purely objective test but that may not have been consti-
tutionally reasonable under the modified objective test perhaps is
described best by Judge Rubin's dissent in United States v. Causey.8
In Causey84 the police used an old arrest warrant and less than
probable cause to arrest Causey and question him about a bank
robbery.8 5 Judge Rubin pointed out that neither the old arrest
warrant nor the weak suspicion taken alone would have given the
police the ability to arrest Causey for the bank robbery; but by using
the two insufficient bases together, the police were able to arrest
Causey and question him in order to develop the probable cause nec-
essary to arrest him for the bank robbery. 6
In terms of investigatory stops, the harm from the individual
defendant's perspective is that the government can do indirectly
through the use of a combination of Fourth Amendment exceptions
what it cannot do directly. For example, a police officer can use a
minor traffic offense to perform a valid Fourth Amendment stop,87
arrest the driver for the infraction,m and then perform a search inci-
81. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1516 (10th Cir. 1988).
82. See notes 251-54 and accompanying text. See also Rudovsky, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
at 467 (cited in note 5) (stating that "[t]he true test of our society's commitment to constitutional
constraints is how government and the courts respond to . . . systemic deviations from
constitutional norms").
83. 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
84. See notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
85. Causey, 834 F.2d at 1180. -
86. Id. at 1188-89 (Rubin, J., dissenting). Judge Rubin stated:
By holding the arrest in Causey constitutional, the majority opinion establishes a new rule
that makes the whole more than the sum of its parts: the police can take two bases for
arrest, each constitutionally insufficient-an unreasonable and arbitrary execution of a
warrant and a suspicion amounting to less than probable cause-and add them together
as a basis for a constitutionally acceptable arrest. This result flies in the face of the
purposes of the fourth amendment and of established Supreme Court precedent.
Id.
87. United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 500 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), and ruling that "[w]hen an officer observes a traffic
offense-however minor-he has probable cause to stop the driver of the vehicle").
88. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 222-23 n.2 (1973) (holding that every
custodial arrest, even those for minor traffic violations, permits a full search of the arrestee's
person); Gustafson E'. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 265 (1973) (stating, "It is sufficient that the officer
had probable cause to arrest the petitioner and that he lawfully effectuated the arrest and placed
the petitioner in custody.... ITihe arguable absence of 'evidentiary' purpose for a search incident
to a lawful arrest is not controlling."). But see Salken, 62 Temple L. Rev. at 254 (cited in note 4)
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dent to arrest 89 to "bootstrap" the search onto the valid Fourth
Amendment stop.9o This combination of exceptions results in a Fourth
Amendment warrant doctrine that an informed police force can use in
tandem to construct a constitutionally valid pretextual search of an
individual's vehicle based solely on a broken tail light or speeding
violation. Thus, the whole can become greater than the sum of its
individual parts.91
Finally, the more difficult questions are whether the benefits of
permitting pretextual activity outweigh the costs associated with that
activity because the power to perform purely objective investigatory
stops is necessary to fight crime or whether society requires a check on
the discretionary power of our police authorities. Professor
Amsterdam asserts that the Fourth Amendment's fundamental
character and substantive content require restraint on the police's
power.9 2 He argues that although the preservation of public order and
the needs of the police to achieve that public order are extremely
important, they do not outweigh the individual needs and rights that
society values more highly.93  Envisioning this requirement, the
Framers drafted the Fourth Amendment as a constitutional limitation
that deliberately subordinates police efficiency in preserving order to
the protection of the people's right to be left alone absent a strong
governmental need.9 4 Moreover, the Supreme Court specifically has
acknowledged the harm to society of unreasonable searches and
(arguing that the power to arrest for a minor traffic offense is precisely the type of evil the Fourth
Amendment was designed to prevent).
89. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (holding that in every instance in which "a
policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile")
(footnote omitted).
90. Although this conduct by a police officer arguably would be unconstitutional under
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932) (holding that "[a]n arrest may not be used as
a pretext to search for evidence"), in most jurisdictions police officers may arrest drivers for traffic
infractions, Robinson, 414 U.S. at 222-23 n.2, and Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 265, allowing the police
then to perform a search incident to arrest of the immediate passenger compartment area.
Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. See also LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 1.4(e) at 93-94 (cited in note 2),
and LaFave, 2 Search and Seizure § 5.2(e) at 457-58 (cited in note 2) (discussing the possibility
that a police officer would use a traffic arrest as a pretext to conduct a search).
91. Officers may use the plain view doctrine along with a minor traffic infraction to
construct a constitutionally valid pretextual stop and search of the contents of a person's vehicle
in plain view even without the police officer having to arrest the person. See Robert Eyer,
Comment, The Plain View Doctrine After Horton v. California: Fourth Amendment Concerns and
the Problem of Pretext. 96 Dickinson L. Rev. 467, 469 n.14 (1992). In light of the search incident to
arrest and plain view doctrines, defining and maintaining the pretext doctrine is necessary to
prevent uncontrolled abuses of power by police officers.
92. See Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at 353-63 (cited in note 3).
93. See id. at 354.
94. See Aro, Note, 70 B.U. L. Rev. at 123-24 (cited in note 4).
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seizures. 95 Thus, while recognizing that the Fourth Amendment does
interfere with well-intentioned police efforts at times, the Court
nevertheless has held that an increase in police efficiency alone cannot
justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment's requirements" and that
evidence obtained as a result of a pretextual stop is subject to
suppression.97 The Framers, therefore, envisioned a free society that
requires a check on the discretionary power of its police authorities to
prevent arbitrary pretextual activity.
To resolve the confusion and disagreement surrounding this
issue, the Supreme Court should announce an appropriate automobile
investigatory stop test. This Note develops a recommended
investigatory stop test by analyzing rulings of the Supreme Court and
the federal circuit courts, and by evaluating the competing policies
presented by this issue. This Note argues that the appropriate
investigatory stop test is a two-part test in which a court initially asks
merely whether the stop was conducted within the bounds of a valid
police procedure. If not, or if the court finds that the police procedure
is invalid, a court must ask whether a reasonable officer would have
performed the stop under the same circumstances. This investigatory
stop test is meaningful because it comports with the strict
requirements of the Fourth Amendment yet does not contain the
drawbacks found in many circuit court holdings.
III. THE BACKDROP OF SUPREME COURT GUIDANCE
In Terry v. Ohio"8 the Supreme Court held that a brief investi-
gatory stop made pursuant to an officer's reasonable suspicion does
not violate the Fourth Amendment.9 In Terry, a police officer stopped
and frisked the defendant on a street in downtown Cleveland.1°° The
95. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968) (stating, "[I]t is simply fantastic to urge that [a
bodily search] procedure performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless...
is a 'petty indignity.' Itis a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict
great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.").
96. See, for example, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (holding that a "murder
scene exception" to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement was inconsistent with that
amendment and that a warrantless search of an apartment is not permissible merely because a
homicide occurred there); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62 (1967) (holding that a statute
permitting a court to order electronic eavesdropping violated the Fourth Amendment because the
statute was too broad in its coverage).
97. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,655 (1961).
98. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
99. Id.at21.
100. Id. at 1. The police officer patted down the outside of Terry's clothing and felt a pistol in
the left breast pocket of Terry's overcoat. Id.
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officer said he performed the stop and frisk because Terry and his
companion looked suspicious.101 In holding that the stop of the
defendant was valid, the Court stated that the validity of inves-
tigatory stops must be judged against an objective standard, asking
whether the facts available to the officer at the time of the search or
seizure would justify a reasonably cautious person in believing that
the action taken was appropriate. 0 2 In finding the officer's stop of the
defendant was conducted reasonably in light of the dangers faced in
that situation, the Terry Court further ruled that evidence discovered
by a search or seizure not reasonably related in scope to the justifica-
tion for the initiation of the search or seizure may not be introduced2 °3
Thus, in what is known commonly as a Terry stop, the fundamental
questions a court must ask are: (1) whether the officer possessed a
reasonable suspicion to make the seizure based on an objective
assessment of the facts available to him at the time the stop was
made (that is, whether the officer's action was justified at its
inception), and (2) whether the scope of the search was reasonably
related to the facts and circumstances that initially justified the intru-
sion. 0 4
Furthermore, because the Supreme Court has held that an
ordinary traffic stop is a confined seizure more similar to an investiga-
tive detention than to a custodial arrest,'0 5 courts specifically apply the
Terry investigative detention test to vehicle investigatory stops.' °6
101. Id.at6-7.
102. Id. at 21-22 (stating the question as follows: "[Would the facts available to the officer at
the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the
action taken was appropriate?"). The Court elaborated that "[a]nything less would invite
intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than
inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction." Id. at 22.
103. Id. at 28-29. The strength required for the connection between the scope of the search
and the circumstances prompting that search is somewhat confusing in Terry because the Court
stated earlier in the opinion that "It]he scope of the search must be 'strictly tied to and justified
by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Id. at 19. Because this Note
argues that the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits have not given
appropriate consideration to a requirement that the scope of the search be reasonably related to
the circumstances justifying the stop, it is not necessary to address the different justification
levels other than to acknowledge that if the more demanding "strictly tied to and justified by"
standard is used-as was used in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)-the arguments in
this Note have even more weight because more than a mere reasonable relationship between the
circumstances justifying the stop and the scope of the search would require a more extensive
judicial review than the purely objective test.
104. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20. See also LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure § 9.3 at 423 (cited in
note 2).
105. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,439 (1984).
106. See, for example, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 875 (4th Cir. 1992). Circuit
courts have not differed over the application of the Terry standard to investigatory stop cases;
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Thus, although a police officer may conduct a brief investigative stop
of a vehicle,1°7 this stop must be justified by particular, articulable
facts that are sufficient to arouse a reasonable suspicion of criminal
conduct. 08 The pretext doctrine, which operates as a means to bar
investigative stops not based on reasonable suspicion, logically flows
from these holdings. The Court, however, simultaneously clarified
and confused the content and structure of the pretext doctrine in six
cases decided between 1978 and 1985.109
In Scott v. United States,1o the defendant argued that the
Court should suppress evidence of his illegal conduct involving the
sale of narcotics because the agents, who obtained the evidence by
wiretapping, did not make a good faith effort to comply with the
minimization requirement of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act."' The Court rejected that argument, holding that
subjective intent alone does not make otherwise lawful conduct
unconstitutional." 2  It further stated that since Terry, the Court
consistently has held that an officer's subjective state of mind will not
invalidate his actions as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively,
justify that activity., 3 Even if this holding in Scott requires courts to
apply an objective test to pretextual Fourth Amendment activity,
which is not clear,1 4 it certainly does not mandate that courts apply a
purely objective test to pretextual stop cases. Rather, it merely rejects
a subjective test to examine an officer's underlying intent."5
rather, the courts disagree about the proper interpretation of the Terry standard in these cases.
See Part IV of this Note."
107. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653.
108. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878-82.
109. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979);
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981); United States v.
Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985).
110. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
111. Id.at135.
112. Id. at 135-37.
113. Id. at 138. The Court stated that since Terry it has
held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated
by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not
invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that
action .... The Courts of Appeals which have considered the matter have likewise
generally followed these principles, first examining the challenged searches under a
standard of objective reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or
motivation of the officers involved.
Id.
114. LaFave, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at 489 (cited in note 5). See also note 147 and accompanying
text.
115. Indeed, one circuit court specifically distinguished Scott by stating that the decision,
although "often cited in the pretext context, did not emphasize the arbitrariness problem because
it was not before the Court" because the officer in Scott had a warrant to conduct the search; thus,
police discretion was not involved. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1516 n.3 (1988).
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Since Scott, the Court has refined the investigatory stop doc-
trine somewhat. In Delaware v. Prouse,'16 the Court addressed the
constitutionality of officers conducting routine stops of vehicles to
check the operator's driver's license and automobile registration
without a reasonable suspicion that the driver was operating the car
in violation of law.," The state argued that its interest in achieving
roadway safety outweighed the intrusion on the privacy of the
detained drivers.118 The Court rejected this argument, holding that
individual stops are permissible only on individualized reasonable
suspicion, which requires an articulable and reasonable suspicion that
an individual in the automobile has violated the law; therefore, a stop
of a vehicle merely to check the driver's license and automobile
registration is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."19
Although the Court invalidated a stop of a pedestrian on
Fourth Amendment grounds in Brown v. Texas'20 , the case
nonetheless added to the investigatory stop doctrine. In Brown, two
policemen saw the defendant, Brown, walking away from another
man in an alley in an area known to have a high incidence of drug
traffic. After stopping the defendant and asking his identity, the
police frisked him. 21 Brown argued that the stop was unreasonable
because the police did not have a reasonable suspicion that he was
involved in criminal conduct.'2 2 The Court found that the Fourth
Amendment requires that (1) a seizure be based on specific, objective
facts indicating that society's interests demand the seizure of the
individual, or (2) the seizure be carried out according to a plan that
embodies explicit limitations on police conduct.'1' Because the police
did not have a reasonable suspicion to stop and ask Brown to identify
himself and the police department did not have a plan that met the
stated requirements, the Court reversed Brown's conviction.' 24
Furthermore, two years after Brown, the Court attempted to
clarify the law on this issue by holding that courts must consider the
totality of the circumstances when determining if an investigatory
stop of a vehicle is justified, and based on these circumstances the
116. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
117. Id. at 650.
118. Id. at 655.
119. Id. at 663.
120. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
121. Id. at 48-49. Brown refused to give his identity to the police, who then arrested him for
violating a Texas statute that made it a criminal act for a person to refuse to give the police his
name and address when the police lawfully stopped the person.
122. Id.at51.
123. Id,
124. Id. at 53.
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detaining officer must particularly and objectively suspect the
detained person detained of criminal activity. 12 5 The Cortez Court held
that constitutionally sufficient reasonable suspicion must contain two
elements: (1) an analysis based on all of the circumstances that (2)
must raise a suspicion of wrongful activity. 12 6 Although attempting to
clarify the doctrine, this refinement still left the test of reasonable
suspicion in the investigatory stop area vague. 127
The next time the Court substantially ventured into the inves-
tigatory stop doctrine was in United. States v. Villamonte-Marquez,12 8
in which the Court actually addressed, although only briefly, a pretext
question. In Villamonte-Marquez, the Court upheld the respondents'
drug convictions that had resulted from the boarding of a sailboat by
customs officers to inspect the ship's documents, as authorized by a
federal statute, despite the respondents' argument that the customs
officers had a pretextual motive for the search because they were
acting on an informant's tip that drugs were aboard.129  The Court
summarily dismissed this argument in a footnote. 30
Although some commentators suggest that Villamonte-Mar-
quez weakens arguments that the pretext doctrine is still valid,' 3' a
close analysis of the respondents' argument and the Court's response
to that argument shows that the respondents were making a
subjective intent argument, urging the Court to look beyond the
officers' objective basis for performing the stop and consider their
125. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) (holding that objective facts and
circumstances justified the officers' investigative stop based on suspicion that the defendants
were using a pickup truck to transport illegal aliens).
126. Id. at 418.
127. See LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure § 9.3(a) at 424 (cited in note 2). Indeed, at least one
writer has commented that "Cortez calls for an all-encompassing review, which takes both
objective and subjective factors into account in assessing a Terry stop's reasonableness." Aro,
Note, 70 B.U. L. Rev. at 128 (cited in note 4). However, the lower courts have not interpreted
Cortez in that manner. In fact, most courts interpret cases such as Villamonte-Marquez and
Macon as barring a court's inquiry into an officer's subjective state of mind. See Part IV of this
Note. But see United States v. Gutierrez-Mederos, 965 F.2d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
"[t]o evaluate the validity of appellant's [pretext] claim, we must review ... the motivation or
primary purpose of the arresting officer," and noting that if an officer's "conduct satisfies this
subjective standard, it also will meet the objective test outlined by the United States Supreme
Court in Maryland v. Macon").
128. 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
129. The Court mentions the respondents' pretext claim in Villamonte-Marquez only in a
footnote, which states: "Respondents ... contend . . . that because the customs officers were
accompanied by a Louisiana state policeman, and were following an informant's tip that a vessel
in the ship channel was thought to be carrying marihuana, they may not rely on the statute
authorizing boarding for inspection of the vessel's documentation." Id. at 584 n.3.
130. Id. (stating that "[tihis line of reasoning was rejected in Scott ... and we again reject
•it").
131. See, for example, Burkoff, 17 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. at 538-44 (cited in note 44); Aro, Note,
70 B.U. L. Rev. at 161 (cited in note 4).
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underlying motive. The Court's summary rejection of this argument
does not necessarily reject a modified objective test because the Court
did not address whether a reasonable officer would have stopped the
boat in the same circumstances. Thus, the Villamonte-Marquez Court
left open the question of which objective test is appropriate.
Finally, in Maryland v. Macon132 the respondent, convicted of
distribution of obscene material, argued that an officer's actions in
purchasing and keeping two magazines but then retrieving the money
paid after arresting the defendant constituted an unlawful seizure
under the Fourth Amendment because the officer subjectively in-
tended to retrieve the money while keeping the magazines. 13 3 The
Court rejected this argument, ruling that whether an officer violates
the Fourth Amendment turns on an objective examination of the offi-
cer's conduct considering the facts and circumstances confronting the
officer and not on the officer's state of mind when performing the
challenged action. 34 The Court then held that the sale of the maga-
zines was not a warrantless seizure simply because of the officer's
subjective intent to retrieve the purchase money.35 Although the
Court once again rejected the subjective intent test as a means to
show a pretext,136 it did not address whether a modified objective
inquiry is required. Thus, the circuit courts were left without
guidance from the Court as to which objective test they should apply.
This Note now turns to the reasoning these courts have used to select
the test for their jurisdictions.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE REASONING OF THE COURTS OF APPEALS
This Part analyzes the reasoning of the circuit courts that have
addressed which test is appropriate in determining the reasonableness
132. 472 U.S. 463 (1985).
133. Id. at 470.
134. Id. at 470-71 (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136-38 (1978)).
135. Macon, 472 U.S. at 471.
136. Id. at 470-71. Some writers nonetheless argue that Brown v. Texas, United States v.
Cortez, and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce have "mandated a partially subjective inquiry." See,
for example, Aro, Note, 70 B.U. L. Rev. at 151 (cited in note 4). As discussed in Part III of this
Note, however, the more recent Supreme Court cases specifically have rejected a subjective test,
and all circuit courts except the Ninth Circuit have rejected a subjective test for automobile
investigatory stops. See Part IV of this Note.
The Ninth Circuit has held that an arresting officer's motivation is relevant when an arrest is
alleged to have been a mere pretext in order to conduct an unauthorized search. United States V.
Smith, 802 F.2d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Williams v. United States, 418 F.2d 159, 161
(9th Cir. 1969), affd, 401 U.S. 646 (1971)). The Ninth Circuit continues to adhere to a subjective
test in analyzing alleged pretextual police conduct. See United States v. Huffhines, 967 F.2d 314,
317 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Gutierrez.Mederos, 965 F.2d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1992).
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of an alleged pretextual investigatory stop. It first examines the
reasoning of those courts adopting the purely objective test1 37 and then
analyzes the reasoning of the courts adopting the modified objective
standard. 138
A. Courts Adopting the Purely Objective Test
In United States v. Hawkins,139 the Third Circuit, citing Scott,
Macon, and Villamonte-Marquez, adopted an investigatory stop test
similar to the purely objective test. The court initially cited Scott and
Macon for authority that Fourth Amendment inquiries focus on the
objective facts available to the officer rather than the seizing officer's
state of mind, and thus a seizure that is valid based on the stated
justification cannot be questioned on the basis that the seizing officer's
137. See the courts' holding in United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Mitchell, 951 F.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498 (8th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d
1179 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc); United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1987); United
States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1987).
138. See the courts' holding in United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Pino, 855 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1988), amended to add concurrence, 866 F.2d 147
(6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Crotinger, 928 F.2d 203 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Smith,
799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986). Note, however, the the Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Ferguson,
8 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 1993), rejected the modified objective test and arguably adopted the purely
objective test. See note 244.
139. 811 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1987). In Hawkins, two Philadelphia police officers were
performing undercover observation of a house for suspected narcotics activity. At 11:30 p.m., the
officers saw a car with a driver and a passenger pull up to the house, the passenger walk into the
house, return to the car to talk to the driver, and then walk back into the house. The passenger
then exited the house with two men and all three men got into the car. The car drove away and
the officers, who were in an unmarked van, followed for several miles, during which time the
driver crossed over the solid double yellow lines on the road and ran a red light before parking.
The officers parked behind the car, turned on the van's high beam lights, approached the car on
foot, and identified themselves to the occupants of the car. One of the officers observed Hawkins,
who was sitting behind the driver, attempting to tuck something into the rear seat of the car. At
that time, the officers ordered the occupants out of the car. As Hawkins exited the car, one officer
saw him drop a gun on the seat and cover it with a pillow. The officer then retrieved the gun and
placed Hawkins under arrest. A frisk of all four of the car's occupants revealed narcotics on
Hawkins and the front-seat passenger. Id. at 212.
After Hawkins was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, he moved to
suppress the gun as unlawfully obtained on the basis that the officers' stop of the car was an
illegal stop under the Fourth Amendment. Even though the officers testified at the suppression
hearing that they stopped the car to investigate the traffic violations, the district court held that
no evidence supported a stop based on the reasons given by the officers. The district court
nevertheless found that the events observed by the officers during their surveillance created
reasonable suspicion to believe that the automobile's occupants were engaged in a narcotics
violation. The court thus concluded that the stop was legal, and the gun was admissible evidence.
Hawkins appealed his subsequent conviction, arguing that the district court erred in holding (1)
that the facts available to the officers were sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that the
car's occupants were engaged in narcotics violations, and (2) that a stop could be justified on
grounds different from those stated by the officers. Id. at 212-13.
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subjective motivation was improper. 140 This test is similar in effect to
the purely objective test, which holds that a stop is valid if the officer
could have made a valid stop based on any infraction, despite the
actual reason for the stop.' 41 In Hawkins, however, the district court
had found no evidence supporting the stated purpose for the
investigatory stop-to investigate based on the traffic violations;
therefore, the purely objective test logically required the circuit court
to hear Hawkins's challenge that the stop was not valid based on its
stated purpose. The circuit court, however, failed to hear Hawkins'
challenge. Rather, it altered its version of the test to find that stops
based on objective reasonable suspicion are valid even though officers
attempt to justify the stop on pretextual grounds.'4 The circuit court
thus essentially held that a district court may disregard the
justification advanced by the investigating officers and conduct a
review of the officers' actions based on the facts presented at trial to
determine if a reasonable basis existed for the stop.43
In a well-reasoned dissent, Judge Rosenn identified various
weaknesses in the majority's reasoning. First, he noted that the ma-
jority believed that even if police lack reasonable suspicion at the time
of the investigatory stop, reasonable suspicion found in hindsight will
allow admission of the evidence. 44 The flaw in the majority's belief is
that Fourth Amendment violations occur at the moment of the police
intrusion, not later, when the police finally discover something that
only then creates a reasonable suspicion.' 45  He argued that the
majority had extended the objective probable cause standard that
applies to a full arrest to the reasonable suspicion requirement for an
investigatory stop without necessity or authority.'4 He also argued
that although the Supreme Court has held that a court may supply
grounds on which the officer did not in fact rely to support the
140. Id. at 214.
141. See notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
142. Hawkins, 811 F.2d at 214-15. The Hawkins court thus concluded that the observations
by the officers at the house gave the officers reasonable suspicion of narcotics activity, and hence,
the court upheld the stop as supported by reasonable suspicion, thereby affirming the conviction
of Hawkins. Id. at 215.
143. See id. The court did note, however, that it generally disapproves of pretextual
behavior by police, even though it offered no means by which it would hold law enforcement
personnel accountable for this conduct. Id. The circuit court also stated that the exclusionary
rule was designed to deter unconstitutional conduct, but not to deter perjury, when addressing
Hawkins's argument that the police should not be permitted to give false reasons for investigatory
stops to make the stops appear valid. Id. Finally, the circuit court distinguished Smith by
stating that the instant case was different from "those cases where the police, having no valid
basis for a stop or arrest, relied on a pretext to justify their actions." Id.
144. Id at 221 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 221-22.
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probable cause necessary for a full arrest, the Court has not held that
the standard for reasonable suspicion is similarly purely objective.
Rosenn then observed that the cases cited by the majority that set
forth the objective reasonable suspicion standard do not dictate an
entirely objective analysis but suggest that reasonable suspicion
"must be both objectively reasonable and subjectively actual."41
Finally, he noted that Terry's language itself suggests only that a
police officer's subjective suspicions must be objectively reasonable,
not that the court may supply these suspicions, as the district court
did in Hawkins.'48 Judge Rosenn concluded that the action of courts in
supplying the basis ex post for what police believe to be an
impermissible stop at the time of the stop destroys the rationale for
the constitutional validity of warrantless searches and seizures.149
The Second Circuit arguably addressed this issue in United
States v. Nersesian.w° In Nersesian, the Second Circuit adopted the
purely objective test as the appropriate test to apply to pretextual
challenges to temporary detentions.151 The court interpreted Terry152
and Cortez'3 as requiring a "totally objective" standard for analyzing
the constitutionality of a seizure or search.1' 4 The court then held that
if any valid basis for a detention exists at the time of its inception,
police reliance on a pretext to perform or continue the detention will
not render that detention and the following search unconstitutional.155
The court failed, however, to address whether a pretextual stop
purportedly performed because a person committed a minor infraction
would constitute a valid basis for an investigatory search, even though
the officer actually stopped the individual solely to perform the search
despite the lack of any infraction.'5 The court thus failed to institute
147. Id. at 222 (emphasis in original).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 223.
150. 824 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1987). One of the defendants in Nersesian, Elias Abdouch, was
convicted on one count of conspiring to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982)
after police investigators stopped Abdouch at the Newark Airport and conducted a pat-down
search, finding that he was carrying a stack of bills consisting primarily of fifty and hundred
dollar bills. Nersesian, 824 F.2d at 1315. On appeal, Abdouch argued that because the police did
not conduct the pat-down search immediately after stopping him, the officers did not conduct the
search for their safety but based on a pretext for discovering criminal activity. Id. at 1316.
151. Id.
152. See notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
153. See notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
154. Nersesian, 824 F.2d at 1316 (quoting United States v. Smith, 643 F.2d 942, 944 (2d Cir.
1981)).
155. Nersesian, 824 F.2d at 1316. The court held that a law enforcement officer's reliance
upon a pretextual basis to carry out a search[ ] does not alter the validity of the initial detention





or adopt any mechanism for ferreting out and striking down
pretextual activity.
The next circuit to address this issue was the Fifth Circuit in
United States v. Causey,157 the facts of which were given at the
beginning of Part 1I. 15 Adopting the purely objective test, the Fifth
Circuit reversed the holding of its own panel, affirming the trial
court's decision to convict Causey on bank robbery charges. 159 The
court interpreted the Supreme Court holdings in Scott, Villamonte-
Marquez, and Macon to dictate the rule that when police officers'
actions are objectively lawful, the courts may not question the results
of their investigations based on any subjective intent with which they
may have acted.60 The court thus held that because the police
arrested Causey on the basis of a valid warrant and interrogated him
only after giving him repeated Miranda warnings, the subjective
intent of the officers did not render the arrest unconstitutional.16 The
court concluded that despite objectively reasonable good faith by police
officers, which usually will redeem honest errors and prevent the
exclusion of evidence, the subjective motives of officers who have done
only what the law objectively allows are irrelevant because the
exclusionary rule is meant to deter unlawful actions by police; if the
police have done nothing objectively unlawful, the exclusionary rule
should not apply.162
In dissent, Judge Rubin advocated adoption of the modified
objective test. He agreed with the Eleventh Circuit's characterization
of Scott's requirement of an inquiry into objective reasonableness not
as a requirement to evaluate what an officer legally and objectively
could do, but as a requirement to evaluate what a reasonable officer
would do under the same circumstances.1 63  He then criticized the
majority's rule as making a whole more than the sum of its parts,
meaning that the police could combine individually insufficient
157. 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
158. See notes 17-21 and accompanying text. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Causey argued
that the district court erred in holding that the arrest was valid. Causey rested his argument on
the testimony of an officer that the only reason they arrested Causey on the old petty theft
warrant was to question him about the recent robbery of a Baton Rouge bank. Causey, 834 F.2d
at 1180. The Fifth Circuit panel held that police conduct otherwise lawful was rendered
unconstitutional by their subjective intent alone. Id. The Fifth Circuit, finding a possible
inconsistency between the panel holding and the Supreme Court's decision in Scott, agreed to
hear the case en banc. Id. at 1180.
159. Causey, 834 F.2d at 1184-85.
160. Id. at 1182-84.
161. Id. at 1184.
162. Id. at 1184-85.
163. Id. at 1187 (Rubin, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709, 711
(11th Cir. 1986)).
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constitutional bases to produce a constitutionally acceptable arrest,
such as an arbitrary execution of a warrant added to a suspicion that
does not amount to probable cause. 164  The dissent's most viable
criticism of the Causey majority, however, is also its most logical one.
The dissent argued that by placing heavy emphasis on the underlying
purpose of the exclusionary rule, as noted above,165 the majority failed
to give adequate consideration and weight to the Fourth Amendment's
underlying purposes. 166 The Causey majority thus permitted the pur-
poses of a judicial rule created to effectuate the Amendment to out-
weigh the purposes of the Amendment itself.
The Seventh Circuit addressed the issue in United States v.
Trigg,167 a decision that is internally inconsistent. After interpreting
Scott, Villamonte-Marquez, and Macon as mandating a purely ob-
jective inquiry when examining the reasonableness of challenged
164. Causey, 834 F.2d at 1188-89 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
165. See text accompanying note 162.
166. Causey, 834 F.2d at 1189 (Rubin, J., dissenting). Judge Rubin noted that the Fourth
Amendment was meant to prevent unreasonable and arbitrary seizures. See id. at 1188.
Notwithstanding Judge Rubin's dissent, the Fifth Circuit continues to adhere to the purely
objective test. See United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1467 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Gallo, 927 F.2d 815, 818-19 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hernandez, 901 F.2d 1217, 1219 (5th
Cir. 1990). Interestingly, in Kelley the court stated that "under appropriate circumstances,
extensive questioning about matters wholly unrelated to the purpose of a routine traffic stop may
violate the Fourth Amendment." Kelley, 981 F.2d at 1470. Thus, although the court continues to
apply the purely objective test to the initial stop of automobiles by police, it has left open the
possibility that the second prong of the Terry temporary detention test regarding the permissible
scope of a stop may be violated by a police officer's pretextual motive. See note 104 and
accompanying text.
167. 878 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1989). In early February 1988, Officers Bird and Edenfield
arrested Trigg on an outstanding body attachment that had issued due to Trigg's failure to appear
in court several times. While Trigg was detained, Officer Bird ran a computer check, which
showed that Trigg's driver's license was suspended. Trigg was not told about the problem with
the license. Rather, the officers returned his license without any notice about the suspension
when he was released from detention. Approximately a month and a half later, after Officer Bird
had been assigned to the narcotics unit, Bird was investigating some of the known crack houses in
the area when he drove by Trigg's house and noticed a maroon Cadillac in the driveway that he
had seen in front of a known crack house the previous week. Bird set up surveillance of the
automobile and soon thereafter, Trigg got into the Cadillac and drove away. Bird followed Trigg
and, after remembering the events of early February, had police headquarters confirm that
Trigg's license was still suspended. The police then stopped and arrested Trigg for driving on a
suspended license. The arresting officer, Officer Royse, testified that in the Allen County Police
Department the decision to arrest a person for driving with a suspended license versus simply
issuing a traffic citation was left to the discretion of the individual officer and that he arrested
Trigg because he knew Trigg's history of not appearing in court and that Trigg had tried to flee
from Royse after Royse stopped him. While conducting a full pat-down search incident to arrest,
the officer found 53 grams of cocaine in Trigg's coat pocket. Id. at 1038.
After indictment for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(1988), Trigg moved to exclude all evidence obtained on the basis that the police had used the
suspended license as a pretext to search for evidence of narcotics. The district court granted
Trigg's motion, ruling that the arrest for a suspended driver's license was a pretext to search for
narcotics. The government appealed this decision. Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1038.
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police activity, 168 the court noted that this approach would diminish
the possibility of discovering pretextual seizures substantially. 169 The
court thus found that Supreme Court precedent required adoption of
the purely objective standard even though the court also found that
the standard required relevant objective facts to be determined,
including a review of whether the police were engaged in activities in
which they normally would not be engaged.170  Moreover, after citing
United States v. Guzman with approval for the proposition that an
arrest is unreasonable if the usual police practice is not to arrest a
person for a certain offense,'17  the court formulated a two-part
reasonable arrest test that considers: (1) whether the officer had
probable cause to believe that a crime had been or was being
committed by the suspect, and (2) whether state or local law
authorized the officer to perform a custodial arrest for the particular
offense.172 The court ruled that if both factors are satisfied, then the
arrest is necessarily reasonable. 73 The court, however, then stated
that this two-part test could be restated simply: if a police officer is
doing no more than he or she is legally and objectively authorized to
do, a seizure is constitutional.' 74 This statement is an articulation of
the purely objective test.
The opinion of the Trigg majority strains logic. The court in-
itially leaned toward adopting the modified objective standard based
on its concern that the adoption of a purely objective standard would
reduce the court's chances of discovering unconstitutional pretextual
arrests. 75  In the latter part of its analysis, however, the court
completely changed its opinion and embraced the purely objective test
based on clear misinterpretations of Supreme Court precedent.176 The
court gave no explanation for its disregard of the pretextual activity
168. Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1040.
169. Id. (citing United States v. Keller, 499 F. Supp. 415, 417 (N.D. I1. 1980)).
170. Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1040 (stating that "[o]ne such factor might be the participation of
police officers in activities they would ordinarily not be engaged in").
171. Id. at 1041. The court also acknowledged that the Supreme Court had held in Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) that "the discretionary exercise of police power may be
unconstitutional in certain circumstances." Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1041.
172. Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1041. In a later case, the court explained its test as follows: "To
determine the reasonableness of an arrest, we only consider two objective factors: (1) did the
arresting officer have probable cause to believe the defendant had committed or was committing
an offense; and (2) was the arresting officer authorized by state and/or municipal law to effect a
custodial arrest for the particular offense." United States v. Somers, 950 F.2d 1279, 1284 n.1 (7th
Cir. 1991). The Somers court even stated, "In [Trigg], we indicated that the concept of 'pretextual
arrest' may no longer be a viable theory in this circuit." Id.
173. Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1041.
174. Id. (citing Causey, 834 F.2d at 1182).
175, See notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
176. Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1Q42. See notes 168-70, 174 and accompanying text.
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concern. It then remanded the case to the district court to apply its
newly adopted purely objective standard.177 On remand, the district
court applied the purely objective standard and entered an order
denying the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence. 178
In an insightful concurring opinion, Judge Ripple recognized
that the real issue before the court was the determination of which
objective elements the court must use to determine whether a pretex-
tual seizure is unconstitutional.1 9  After outlining both of the ap-
proaches adopted by other circuit courts, he praised the modified
objective test for promoting the underlying values of the Fourth
Amendment by allowing a court to review the reasonableness of an
officer's actions while not requiring an examination of an officer's
subjective intent.' ° Then, after noting that the Supreme Court has
not adopted the purely objective test, 8' he suggested that the
majority's opinion did not foreclose judicial review of gross abuse of
authority by police officers. 182 His reasoning, however, contains two
flaws. First, the test adopted by the majority actually would uphold
the gross abuses that Judge Ripple described in his concurrence. 18
The purely objective test that the Seventh Circuit adopted simply
would consider whether the officer could perform the stop or arrest
legally, and, if the jurisdiction gives the police the authority to arrest,
the activity would be constitutional. Second, he appears to forget that
the circuit's lower courts must apply the majority's test. Thus, even
though the circuit court may refuse to countenance a gross abuse by
broadening the scope of the purely objective test, its district courts are
bound to apply the purely objective test strictly, as the district court
177. Id.
178. United States v. Trigg, 925 F.2d 1064, 1064 (7th Cir. 1991). The district court did not
publish an opinion, but merely entered an order denying Trigg's motion to suppress. See id.
179. Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1042 (Ripple, J., concurring). Judge Ripple recognized that Supreme
Court cases clearly have mandated that "[a] court is not to inquire into the officer's subjective
intent." Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1043 (stating that "the Supreme Court has not articulated the rigid position,
suggested by the panel majority, that the existence of legal authority to undertake an action
precludes all judicial inquiry into the reasonableness-in the constitutional sense-of the action")
(emphasis in original).
182. Id. (stating that "I have no doubt that, when faced with such an abuse, the court would
not countenance it").
183. Judge Ripple cited Judge Higginbotham's concurrence in Causey, in which Judge
Higginbotham expressed his concern that police would stockpile arrest warrants for traffic
offenses to allow them to arrest a particular citizen whenever they desire. Id. The stop upheld in
Causey, although arguably not involving a stockpiled arrest warrant, is indistinguishable in result
from even the "stockpiled arrest warrant" situation when the purely objective test is applied.
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did on remand, denying Trigg's motion to suppress the evidence
without opinion.'m
Trigg, however, had not finished defending his case. He
appealed the district court's holding on remand, challenging the
correctness of the new standard and the district court's application of
that standard.85 Specifically, he argued that courts should consider
an officer's conformance to usual police practices as part of their
objective examination of the reasonableness of an arrest.m On
appeal, the Seventh Circuit initially cited Villamonte-Marquez'7 and
Gustafson v. Florida'" for the proposition that the Supreme Court has
rejected the use of usual police practices as a factor that may be
considered in an objective analysis.18 9 Those two cases, however, do
not reject the use of usual police practices in the objective
investigatory stop analysis. They simply state that (1) a lack of police
regulations or policy requiring a seizure is not determinative of the
Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure issue,' 90 and (2) the subjective
intent and underlying motive of the police officer is not a proper
inquiry under the objective test.' 9' Also, the court apparently forgot
its own language in the first Trigg appeal, it stated that conformance
to activities in which police ordinarily engage is a factor that might be
relevant to the objective determination of the reasonableness of the
seizure. 92  Nevertheless, based on this misinterpretation of
Villamonte-Marquez and Gustafson, the Seventh Circuit found that it
could not consider the officer's conformance to usual police practices
when deciding the reasonableness of the defendant's arrest.
Therefore, it affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to
suppress. 93
The Seventh Circuit expressly recognized the weakness of its
ruling by finding that the approach it adopted virtually eliminated the
chance that a court would discover pretextual seizures but felt that
the approach was consistent with Gustafson and Villamonte-
Marquez. 94 Thus, it explicitly rejected the opportunity to supply a
constitutional tool for its district courts to use in addressing pretextual
184. See note 178 and accompanying text.
185. Trigg, 925 F.2d at 1065.
186. Id.
187. 462 U.S. 579 (1983). See notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
188. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
189. Trigg, 925 F.2d at 1065.
190. Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 265.
191. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 584 n.3.
192. Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1040. See also notes 170-71. and accompanying text.
193. Trigg, 925 F.2d at 1065-66.
194. Id. at 1065.
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investigatory stops and arrests, despite the fact that the court openly
recognized the need for these tools and seemed to permit their use in
its prior ruling in this case.195 Even worse, the court distorted
Supreme Court precedent to arrive at this ruling.196
The Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of which test to apply to
pretextual challenges in United States v. Cummins.197  The Eighth
Circuit panel expressly rejected the modified objective test, declining
to join the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits. 19s In its reasoning, the court
initially found that an otherwise valid stop is not invalidated simply
because an officer has intuitive suspicions that automobile occupants
are engaged in criminal activity. 199 The Cummins court stated that
the Supreme Court, although not directly deciding this issue, has held
that courts faced with a seizure challenged as pretextual activity
should make an objective inquiry into the officer's actions.' °° The
Cummins court also noted that the Supreme Court has ruled that the
195. See notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
196. See notes 187-91 and accompanying text. Indeed, in Brown v. Texas and Delaware v.
Prouse, both decided six years before Villamonte-Marquez, the Supreme Court specifically held
that a seizure performed pursuant to a plan that embodies specific, neutral limitations on the
actions of individual police officers would satisfy the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
requirement. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); Delaware u. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663
(1979). The Trigg court thus appeared to be searching for a reason to exclude the use of usual
police practices in its objective analysis of the reasonableness of arrests.
197. 920 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1990). Just before midnight on November 10, 1988, Officer
Bernal observed suspicious behavior by Cunmins and a passenger, Akins, in a green Volkswagen
at an intersection traffic light in Little Rock, Arkansas. Cummins, who was the driver of the car,
and his passenger, Akins, kept glancing at Officer Bernal instead of proceeding when the light
was green in favor of the Volkswagen. After following the green Volkswagen for several blocks,
Officer Bernal stopped the car by turning on his blue lights after Cummins, the driver of the car,
made a right turn without giving the required signal. The surveillance of the Volkswagen
included observation of the car when it made a momentary stop at a closed car wash where the
occupants of the car continued to watch Officer Bernal. Officer Bernal asked Cummins to explain
his unusual behavior. Cummins replied that his passenger, whom Cummins called Tim, had
distracted him. However, when Bernal asked the passenger his name, Akins identified himself as
Michael Mayfield. Id. at 500. Based on this inconsistency, and on Akins's suspicious behavior,
Bernal placed Akins in the back seat of the patrol car. Id. After placing Akins in the police car,
Bernal looked inside the Volkswagen and discovered a bag containing marijuana on the floor of
the car behind the passenger seat. As a result of this discovery, Officer Bernal arrested Cummins
and Akins.
Cummins and Akins moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the stop, arguing that the
officer's pretextual motive for conducting the stop rendered it unlawful. The magistrate,
however, found the stop valid because the decision to stop the car was made on a reasonable and
objective basis. Id. On appeal, Cummins and Akins argued that Officer Bernal's stop of the car
was pretextual because the officer's actual reason for making the stop was his suspicion about the
defendants' conduct rather than Cummins's minor traffic violation; thus, the stop was an
unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment because a reasonable officer would not have
made the stop for the right turn without signaling in the absence of the invalid purpose. Id. at
500-01. Cummins and Akins cited United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986), and
argued that the appropriate test was the modified objective test. Cummins, 920 F.2d at 501.




officer's state of mind at the time of the challenged seizure is irrele-
vant in deciding whether the police violated the Fourth Amendment.2o1
The court, applying the purely objective standard, found that the stop
of Cummins was not pretextual because the officer believed that the
defendant had committed a traffic violation.202
The court's test would deem blatantly pretextual stops if an
officer does no more than she legally is authorized to do.203  In a
footnote, the court noted that an officer's motive would become
relevant if the court determined that a Fourth Amendment violation
actually had occurred. 20 4 The fallacy of this logic is that under the
purely objective test, a finding of a pretextual stop would be all but
nonexistent because police have broad discretion and authority to stop
individuals.20 5 Also, the court did not explain exactly how it or a lower
court would determine when a pretextual Fourth Amendment
violation had occurred. Hence, even though the court noted that the
Eighth Circuit has ruled specifically that pretextual stops are
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, 2 6 the court rejected
any standard that substantially would enhance the chances of
discovering pretextual stops.
The District of Columbia Circuit addressed this issue in 1991.
In United States v. Mitchell2°7 an officer stopped the defendant after
observing him driving at a high rate of speed, stopping suddenly, and
then turning sharply.20 After the stop, other officers discovered that
both the defendant and his passenger were carrying weapons, as well
as about fifty-five grams of cocaine in a locked tool compartment in
201. Id. (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978) and Maryland v. Macon, 472
U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985)).
202. Cummins, 920 F.2d at 501.
203. Id. (quoting Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1041 (relying on Causey, 834 F.2d at 1184)). Indeed,
Judge Bowman even stated, "It is also our view that the stop remains valid even if the officer
would have ignored the traffic violation but for his other suspicions." Cummins, 920 F.2d at 501.
204. Cummins, 920 F.2d at 501 n.3 (stating that "[w]hen this threshold issue is resolved in
the affirmative, the officer's state of mind may be relevant in determining whether the
exclusionary rule should be applied").
205. If an investigatory step "remains valid even if the officer would have ignored the traffic
violation but for his other suspicions," id. at 501, then an officer has free reign to stop and
investigate any motorist he pleases based on any minor traffic infractions, no matter how
arbitrary the decision to stop the motorist may be.
206. Id. (citing United States v. Portwood, 857 F.2d 1221, 1223 (8th Cir. 1988)). See also
United States v. Woodall, 938 F.2d 834 (8th Cir. 1991). Even though the Eighth Circuit continues
to hold that 'pretextual stops are unreasonable under the fourth amendment," Woodall, 938 F.2d
at 836, it also continues to adhere to its adoption of the purely objective standard. See United
States v. Richards, 967 F.2d 1189, 1192 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Maejia, 928 F.2d 810, 814
(8th Cir. 1991).
207. 951 F.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
208. Id. at 1293.
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the vehicle.209 The defendant argued that the officer stopped the car
not because of the traffic violations, but because he suspected that the
vehicle was stolen, thereby making the stop unlawful under the
Fourth Amendment.2 1 0 The court rejected this argument, holding that
even if the stop was a mere pretext for the officers to conduct a search
of the vehicle, that fact would not cause the stop to be a violation of
the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.21, The court, citing
Cummins,212 stated that a stop that has a valid basis at its inception
will not violate the Fourth Amendment simply because the officer
intuitively suspects that the vehicle's occupants are engaged in a
crime.21 3  The court thus adopted the purely objective test for its
analysis of pretextual challenges to investigatory stops. In applying
that test, the court held that the objective circumstances here-the
speeding, the sudden stop, and the turn-justified the officer's stop of
the defendant's car despite any pretextual motive the officer may have
had. 214
Finally, the Fourth Circuit confronted this issue in United
States v. Hassan El.215 In Hassan El, the defendant urged the Fourth
Circuit to adopt the modified objective test as the appropriate rule to
evaluate pretextual investigatory stop claims.21r The Fourth Circuit
initially reviewed the modified objective test,2 7 but rejected it,
209. Id. at 1293-94.
210. Id. at 1295.
211. Id.
212. See notes 197-206 and accompanying text.
213. Mitchell, 951 F.2d at 1295.
214. Id.
215. 5 F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 1993). In Hassan El, four Baltimore police officers who were
assigned to investigate narcotics and firearm offenses stopped the Volkswagen Jetta in which
Hassan El was riding because the Jetta's driver, Cole, failed to stop at a stop sign. Id. at 728. One
of the officers, Rood, testified that he did not intend to issue Cole a ticket, but merely stopped the
vehicle to warn Cole of his violation. Indeed, Rood testified that he did not even have a traffic-
ticket book with him. Id. After stopping the Jetta, the officers searched Hassan El because he
appeared very nervous and discovered that he was carrying a weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g) (1988). Hassan El, 5 F.3d at 728. Hassan El was convicted of violating this statute. Id. On
appeal, Hassan El argued that the district court erred in not finding that the stop of the vehicle
violated the Fourth Amendment because the police officers used the minor traffic violation as a
pretext to stop the Jetta to search for more serious criminal activity. Id. at 729.
216. Hassan El, 5 F.3d at 729.
217. Id. at 730. The court also noted that it recently had declined to determine the
appropriate test for analyzing pretextual stop claims in United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868 (4th
Cir. 1992). In Rusher, the defendants, who were convicted of possession of controlled substances
with intent to distribute them under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B) (1988) (methamphetamine)
and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C) (1988) (psilocin), argued that the seizure of the truck in
which they were riding was unconstitutional. Rusher, 966 F.2d at 875. The defendants contended
that the police officer who performed the stop did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the truck
to investigate for drugs and that the stop was pretextual because the officer's stated reasons for
the stop-seat belt violations and an improper license plate-were not the officer's actual
motivation for performing the stop. Id. One of the defendants, Flannery, urged the Fourth
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Circuit to adopt the modified objective test adopted by the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits and find
that a reasonable officer would not have stopped the truck for the minor infractions. Id. at 876.
The court, however, while acknowledging both the purely objective test and the modified objective
test, specifically deferred addressing which objective test to adopt because it found that the stop
would be constitutional under either test. Id. Specifically, the court applied both tests and held
that, on the one hand, the district court properly found that a reasonable officer would have
stopped Flannery based on the infractions while, on the other hand, the officer did nothing more
than he was authorized to do. Id. The court thus concluded that the stop of the truck was
constitutional. Id.
Judge Luttig disagreed with the majority that the result would be the same under both of the
tests, reasoning that the court was compelled to address the question of which standard was
constitutionally mandated. Id. at 885 (Luttig, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment
in part, and dissenting in part). Specifically, Judge Luttig asserted that the evidence in the
record was insufficient for the majority to justify its conclusion that a reasonable officer would
have stopped the truck. Id. at 886. Thus, because the court could not affirm the district court's
ruling under the modified objective test, Judge Luttig felt that the court was required to decide
between that standard and the purely objective standard. Id. at 887. Because Judge Luttig found
severe flaws associated with the modified objective test, id. at 887-88, he felt that the purely
objective test was appropriate. Id. at 887-89. Nevertheless, while criticizing the majority for
flawed reasoning, Judge Luttig erred in his analysis as well.
Judge Luttig stated that only in cases of the most objectionable offenses by motorists would
an officer be able to prove that her fellow officers would have performed the stop. Id. at 888.
Based on this concern, Judge Luttig felt that the difficulty of meeting the reasonable officer
standard as set forth in the modified objective rule would waste judicial and legal resources and
have a deleterious effect on law enforcement in general. Id. Judge Luttig's rejection of the
reasonable officer standard cannot be reconciled, however, with the Supreme Court's statements
that: (1) a court must review the reasonableness of the facts and circumstances of a seizure
considering established Fourth Amendment principles, and (2) an increase in police efficiency
alone does not justify an investigatory stop. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969)
(holding that the reasonableness of a search incident to arrest depends on the facts and
circumstances, which must be viewed in the perspective of established Fourth Amendment
principles, and that a warrantless search of an arrestee's entire house as a search incident to the
lawful arrest of the arrestee in one room of the house was not justified). Judge Luttig appears to
argue that a requirement that law enforcement officials show that a reasonable officer would have
performed the stop would be "devastating for law enforcement" because of the burden it would
place upon law enforcement officers. However, Judge Luttig's concern reduces to an efficiency
argument because police officers are already required to show that a purely objective basis-for
example, a minor traffic offense-existed for the stop to be performed anyway. Thus, the
requirement that police show that a reasonable officer would have performed the stop simply adds
a level of proof to the government's case that is, of course, more burdensome and less efficient for
the government, but that alone, as the Supreme Court has indicated, cannot justify the use of a
purely objective test. See also note 96 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, in a footnote, Judge Luttig criticized the Smith and Guzman courts for not
reconciling their decisions with the Villamonte-Marquez case. Rusher, 966 F.2d at 889 n.8 (Luttig,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). In Villamonte-
Afarquez, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that police officers' boarding of a boat, as
provided for statutorily to examine documents, violated the Fourth Amendment because the
boarding actually was performed to search for drugs. See text accompanying notes 128-30.
However, Judge Luttig failed to classify the modified objective test accurately and did not
compare the modified objective test to the Villamonte-Marquez holding adequately. Judge Luttig
mistakenly classified the modified objective test as a subjective test and stated that the modified
objective test looks to the subjective intent of the officers. Id. at 888 (stating that "the standard is
at least a stalkinghorse for precisely the kind of subjective intent inquiry forbidden by Scott,
Macon, and Villamonte-Marquez"). Moreover, Judge Luttig falsely assumed that Villamonte-
Afarquez foreclosed the modified objective test as an option a circuit court could adopt. See id.
One of this Note's major premises is that both tests-the modified objective test and the purely
objective test-are objective tests; the difference is what objective analysis is performed under
each test. Thus, although correct in reasoning that the majority should have addressed which
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adopting the purely objective test instead.218 Relying heavily on
Cummins2 19 and Trigg,220 the court held that an officer is justified in
stopping a vehicle when he observes a traffic offense, however minor,
or other unlawful conduct, even though the officer would not have
stopped the vehicle in the absence of a hunch or inarticulable
suspicion that an occupant in the vehicle was involved in some
criminal activity.221 The court concluded that the stop of the vehicle
and the subsequent search of the defendant were constitutional
because the driver failed to stop at a stop sign.2 2
B. Courts Adopting the Modified Objective Test
The Tenth Circuit was called on to determine the appropriate
investigatory stop test in United States v. Guzman.22 3  Although in-
investigatory stop test to adopt, Judge Luttig's rejection of the modified objective test and
criticism of the Smith and Guzman cases is critically flawed.
218. Hassan El, 5 F.3d at 730.
219. See notes 197-206 and accompanying text.
220. See notes 167-96 and accompanying text.
221. Hassan El, 5 F.3d at 730-31. The Hassan El court stated:
Although we share the concerns, expressed by the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, of
the arbitrary exercise of police powers, we conclude that the objective test presents the
most principled basis upon which to analyze the validity of investigative stops. We
further conclude that the test is the most in keeping with the repeated admonitions of the
Supreme Court that Fourth Amendment violations turn "on an objective assessment of
the officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time ...
and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken."
Id. (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985)).
222. Hassan El, 5 F.3d at 731 (stating that "[t]he objective circumstances ... provided a
reasonable basis for stopping the Jetta").
223. 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988). While Guzman and his wife, Sonia Cruz-Lazo, were
driving at a lawful speed through New Mexico in early August, 1987, New Mexico State Police
Officer Keene began following the car because he noticed that Guzman was not wearing his seat
belt, a violation of the state's traffic regulations. After confirming that Guzman was not wearing
his seat belt, Keene pulled the car over and asked Guzman for his license and registration.
Guzman then replied that the car was rented. After reviewing the rental agreement, Keene
asked Guzman why a name different than Guzman's was on the rental agreement, and Guzman
responded that the named person was his wife's uncle, who had helped them rent the car because
they did not have a major credit card. Officer Keene then informed Guzman that he had stopped
Guzman for the seat belt violation. Id. at 1513-14.
Officer Keene, instead of issuing a warning or citation, decided to further investigate whether
Guzman and the uncle were transporting contraband in the rented automobile. Officer Keene
then asked Cruz-Lazo a series of questions, at the conclusion of which his suspicions were aroused
based on Cruz-Lazo's behavior. He testified that Cruz-Lazo, who was noticeably pregnant, was
"perspiring and breathing heavily, while Guzman was not" and that she "seemed nervous and
avoided eye contact with him." Id. at 1514. He then continued his interrogation of Guzman in the
rear seat of the defendant's vehicle while he wrote a warning for the seat belt violation. After
giving him the warning, Keene asked Guzman if he was carrying any weapons or contraband.
Guzman replied negatively and told Keene he was "free to look." Id. After Guzman executed a
consent to search form, Officer Keene searched the defendant's car and found a package of
cocaine behind the rear seat. The court explained in a footnote that approximately five kilograms
of cocaine and $40,000 in cash were discovered in subsequent searches of the area behind the rear
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itially recognizing that most courts agree that the appropriate inquiry
regarding a pretextual stop challenge is an objective analysis of the
facts and circumstances rather than an analysis of the officer's subjec-
tive intent, the Tenth Circuit also recognized the controversy sur-
rounding this issue by finding that courts disagree over what objective
elements are dispositive in determining the constitutionality of pre-
textual interferences.224 After reviewing the opposing tests adopted by
other circuits2 5 and discussing the competing policies implicated by
the pretextual investigatory stop doctrine,22 6 the Tenth Circuit found
that Supreme Court precedent clearly implied that pretextual police
activity can violate the Fourth Amendment. 227  The court thus con-
cluded that the modified objective test, as articulated in United States
v. Smith,228 is the proper test for determining the constitutionality of
an investigatory stop because that test maintains the Court's re-
quirement of an objective evaluation of alleged Fourth Amendment
violations yet provides meaningful judicial review of discretionary
police conduct.2 29 After rejecting the government's argument that the
adopted test would limit severely the ability of police to enforce traffic
laws, the court found that it did not have sufficient information to
apply the appropriate test. Hence, the court remanded the case for
further proceedings consistent with its opinion.230
seat and the dashboard. Keene then arrested Guzman and Cruz-Lazo and charged them with
possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. The defendants were indicted under 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1) (1982). The district court granted the defendant's motion to suppress all evidence
discovered in the search of the car, finding that the seat belt violation was a pretextual
justification for an unconstitutional investigatory stop. The government appealed. Guzman, 864
F.2d at 1514-15.
224. Id. at 1515.
225. Id. at 1515-16. The court briefly reviewed the adoption of the modified objective test in
United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986), and the adoption of the purely objective test
in United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
226. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1516.
227. Id. at 1517.
228. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
229. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1517 (citing Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71, (1985) and
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137.38 (1978)).
230. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1518, 1521. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions. The
Tenth Circuit recently reaffirmed its adoption of the modified objective test in United States v.
Horn, 970 F.2d 728, 731 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that because there was no evidence that a state
trooper made a stop for any reason other than the defendant's violation of Utah's license plate
rule and a seat belt violation, the stop could not be pretextual). See also United States v. Walker,
933 F.2d 812, 816 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Deases, 918 F.2d 118, 121-22 (10th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d
441, 446-47 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Corral, 899 F.2d 991, 994 (10th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d 268, 272 (10th Cir. 1989). Note though that in Werking, the court
appeared to add the requirement that "[in a pretextual stop, the law enforcement officer must
deviate from his usual practice." Werking, 915 F.2d at 1408. The court, however, has not applied
this requirement consistently to pretextual step analyses. See, for example, Horn, 970 F.2d at
731.
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The Sixth Circuit addressed this issue in United States v.
Pino231 and United States v. Crotinger.231 In Pino, the defendant ar-
gued that a state trooper's initial stop of the rental car he was driving
violated the Fourth Amendment as a pretextual stop because a rea-
sonable officer would not have stopped him for the minor traffic of-
fenses. 33 Interestingly, both the defendant and the prosecution relied
heavily on United States v. Smith,2 3 4 the Eleventh Circuit case that
adopted the modified objective test,235 in their analyses of the validity
of the stop.2 6 The court relied on Smith's reasoning as well, holding
that the trooper's observations of the traffic offenses gave him a
sufficient basis to stop the defendant.237 The Pino court, however, did
not adopt the modified objective test expressly or address the
pretextual motive issue.38
In Crotinger, however, the Sixth Circuit squarely addressed the
pretextual stop issue and clearly adopted the modified objective test.2 139
The defendant challenged the stop of the vehicle in which he was
riding as pretextual because the officer used the fact that the car was
speeding by eleven miles per hour to stop the car to search it for
231. 855 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1988), amended to add concurrence, 866 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1989).
In Pino, Tennessee Highway Patrolman Terry Thomas, overtook a station wagon driven by Pino
and in which LIera was a passenger. Id at 358. Trooper Thomas, who recently had attended a
seminar conducted by the Drug Enforcement Administration, noticed that the car fit
characteristics for a drug courier. Id. When Trooper Thomas pulled alongside the car to observe
the persons in the car, Pino immediately braked, swerved onto the shoulder of the interstate, then
swerved back onto the road, partially entering the left lane. Id. at 358-59. Pino did not signal his
re-entry onto the interstate. Id. at 359. After waiting for Pino to pass him, Trooper Thomas then
stopped Pino's vehicle. Id. Thomas decided to arrest Pino for the illegal lane change instead of
citing him for it because he suspected that Pino would not pay the fine associated with the lane
change. Id. After arresting Pino and placing him in the police car, Thomas again approached the
vehicle and noticed Llera throw a pillow into the back portion of the car. Id. at 359-60. Thomas
eventually retrieved the pillow and found that it contained cocaine. Id. at 360. Pino and Llera
were convicted for possession of cocaine. Id.
232. 928 F.2d 203 (6th Cir. 1991).
233. Pino, 855 F.2d at 361.
234. 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986).
235. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
236. Pino, 855 F.2d at 361.
237. Id.
238. Id. Indeed, the court specifically stated that because the trooper's "observations gave
him probable cause to believe that Pino had committed a traffic offense and that this was the
reason for the stop ... we need not decide the question whether, if there is adequate reason for a
stop based on a traffic violation, it is necessary that it also be shown that this was in fact the
reason for the stop." Id.
239. Crotinger, 928 F.2d at 206. In Crotinger, a police officer who was using a stationary
radar to catch speeding motorists pulled over a car driven by Guevara and in which Crotinger and
Riley were passengers. Id. at 204. After seeing white pills in the car and receiving inconsistent
answers to questions the officer asked the occupants of the vehicle, the officer obtained Riley's
consent to search the vehicle. Id. at 204-05. The officer discovered 122 pounds of marijuana in
two suitcases in the trunk of the car. Id. at 205. Crotinger was convicted of possession with
intent to distribute marijuana under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1988). Crotinger, 928 F.2d at 204.
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drugs.240 The court based its reasoning and analysis primarily on
Pino's reliance on the Smith court's reasoning.241 Applying that
reasoning, the Crotinger court found that the officer did not perform
the traffic stop for a pretextual reason when it was objectively
reasonable for a police officer operating a speed trap to stop and ticket
vehicles going eleven miles per hour over the speed limit.242 Moreover,
the court found no evidence suggesting that the officer stopped the car
in which the defendant was riding for any reason other than because
it was speeding.243  The court, therefore, found the stop
constitutional.244
240. Crotinger, 928 F.2d at 206.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. (stating that "[o]bjectively, it is reasonable for a police officer operating a speed trap
to stop and ticket vehicles going 66 mph in a 55 mph zone").
244. Id. Until recently, the Sixth Circuit continued to adhere to and apply the modified
objective test. See United States v. Ferguson, 989 F.2d 202, 204 (6th Cir. 1993), vacated by 8 F.3d
325 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. French, 974 F.2d 687, 691-92 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Dunson, 940 F.2d 989, 993 (6th Cir. 1991). In late 1993, however, the Sixth Circuit, sitting en
banc, reheard the Ferguson case and in that rehearing rejected the modified objective test in
favor of a probable cause standard. United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 1993). The
court stated, 'We hold that so long as the officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation has occurred or was occurring, the resulting stop is not lawful and does not violate the
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 391 (citing United States v. Trigg, 925 F.2d 1064, 1065 (7th Cir.
1991)). Unfortunately, the Ferguson majority opinion added tremendous confusion regarding
which investigatory stop test courts in the Sixth Circuit should apply because it (1) failed to
follow Supreme Court precedent, (2) used confusing language, and (3) failed to recognize that it
actually adopted the purely objective test.
First, the court failed to follow Supreme Court precedent in that the court, without authority,
extended the probable cause standard to investigatory stops, even though the Supreme Court has
dictated that the Terry reasonable suspicion test applies to automobile investigatory stops. See
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (holding that the police must have a reasonable
suspicion of a traffic violation to justify a routine traffic stop); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
663 (1979). Second, the court stated that its probable cause standard focuses "on whether this
particular officer in fact had probable cause to believe that a traffic offense had occurred,
regardless of whether this was the only basis for the stop." Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 391 (emphasis
added) (stating further that "this probable cause determination... will turn on what the officer
knew at the time he made the stop" (emphasis in original)). This language is confusing because
the test apparently requires a determination of a police officer's subjective intent for making the
stop. Finally, because a police officer has probable cause to stop the drive of a vehicle when she
observes a traffic offense, however minor, see United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 500 (8th
Cir. 1990), the Ferguson holding actually is the purely objective test because of the following
simple syllogism: A police officer needs probable cause to stop a vehicle to investigate (Ferguson);
a traffice offense, however minor, creates probable cause (Cummins); thus, a police officer may
stop a vehicle and investigate based on any traffic offense no matter how minor. This conclusion
is the purely objective test. In fact, Judge Keith recognized in his dissenting opinion that the
majority merely adopted the purely objective test. Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 396 (Keith, J., dissenting).
For these reasons, Ferguson has muddied the waters surrounding this issue.
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In United States v. Valdez,245 the Eleventh Circuit revisited this
issue and affirmed its adoption of the modified objective test.241 The
court held that when a defendant charges pretextual investigatory
seizure activity by the police, the appropriate test is an objective
assessment of whether a reasonable officer, confronting the same facts
and circumstances that the officer did at the time of the seizure, would
have made the stop in the absence of any illegal motivation.2 47  Based
on its finding that the officers involved would not have pursued a
right-of-way violation by the defendant absent their illegitimate
motivation to discover evidence of narcotics laws violations, the Valdez
court held that the stop was pretextual and therefore
unconstitutional.24
245. 931 F.2d 1448 (11th Cir. 1991).
246. The Eleventh Circuit formulated and adopted the modified objective test in United
States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986). See notes 33-35 and accompanying text. In
Valdez, officers were conducting surveillance of a Miami, Florida residence in May, 1989 when
they observed Valdez arrive at the house in a Honda Accord and then drive away from the house
after two men had loaded the car's trunk with plastic garbage bags. The lead investigator of the
narcotics team, Detective Trujillo, advised a uniformed patrol officer, Officer Almaguer, that
Almaguer should follow Valdez's vehicle and if the vehicle committed a traffic infraction for which
Almaguer normally issues a citation, Almaguer should stop the vehicle and request consent to
search the vehicle. Valdez, 931 F.2d at 1449.
Both Trujillo and Almaguer positioned themselves at an intersection to observe Valdez as he
approached the intersection. Valdez made a right turn at the intersection against a red light
signal and violated the right-of-way of another automobile, causing the other vehicle to slow
down. Neither police officer, however, testified that they observed the speed of the other vehicle
before it slowed down, nor did they testify that they heard the other vehicle's tires screech.
Trujillo then informed Almaguer that Valdez's automobile was the subject of a narcotics
investigation, after which Almaguer followed Valdez for eighteen blocks from the intersection and
then stopped him. After Valdez produced his driver's license, Almaguer obtained Valdez's consent
to search the vehicle. After a search of the car's interior, Almaguer found the plastic trash bags in
the trunk and asked Valdez what the bags contained. Valdez responded that they contained
cocaine. Almaguer placed Valdez under arrest, putting him in the patrol car until Trujillo arrived
on the scene, at which time Almaguer issued Valdez a citation for violation of the other car's
right-of-way. Id. at 1449-50.
Valdez moved that court suppress the evidence obtained from the search of the vehicle
because it was based on a pretextual stop. At the suppression hearing, Almaguer testified that he
did not recall Detective Trujillo's direction to Almaguer that he should stop the Honda only for a
traffic offense for which Almaguer normally would stop a driver. Almaguer also testified that he
would not have stopped the car or issued the right-of-way citation but for Trujillo's instructions
that the narcotics unit wanted the car stopped. Finally, Almaguer testified that he normally did
not search or request to search a vehicle for a right-of-way violation. The district court ruled that
the stop was justified objectively and, therefore, was not a pretextual stop. Valdez appealed. Id.
at 1450.
247. Valdez, 931 F.2d at 1450 (citing Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985)).
248. Valdez, 931 F.2d at 1451. Although it reversed the decision of the district court, the
Eleventh Circuit remanded the case "for the district court to decide whether there was or was not
probable cause for one of the police officers involved in the narcotics investigation to stop Valdez
for violation of the narcotics laws in connection with what [the officers observing the house]
observed during their surveillance of the residence." Id. at 1452.
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V. THE COMPETING POLICIES
Despite the confusion caused by the disagreement among the
circuits regarding pretextual investigatory stops, this Note now at-
tempts to give some structure and order to their opinions and develop
a new, meaningful investigatory stop test. In developing a functional
test by which courts may analyze pretextual investigatory stops, this
Note evaluates the underlying policies implicated by this issue. Two
competing policies drive the development of a functional pretextual
investigatory stop test-individual privacy interests and police crime-
fighting efficiency.249 This Part first examines the concerns regarding
the arbitrary governmental abuse of power and then addresses the
concerns about judicial and law enforcement resources.
The pretextual search doctrine lies between two distinct and
important considerations: (1) unfettered police discretion leading to
arbitrary intrusions into the privacy rights of everyday citizens and
(2) unproductive inquiries into a police officer's subjective intent.2-1
Addressing concerns about the privacy rights of individuals, the
Framers drafted the Fourth Amendment to protect citizens from
unreasonable government interference by imposing the requirement
that officials have sufficient grounds to intrude on a person's pri-
vacy. 251 The Supreme Court specifically recognized this purpose of the
Fourth Amendment in Brown v. Texas, in which it stated that a key
249. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,50-51 (1979).
250. See United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1516 (10th Cir. 1988). Actually, the
competing considerations regarding abuses of discretionary power by police are broader than
those stated. One commentator explained the broad societal considerations surrounding police
abuse of discretion as follows:
An essential question... is whether the institutions, programs and principles we
have developed to empower the police are also adequate to the task of controlling the
police. We must also ask whether in our society, which relies substantially on the courts
to regulate and control governmental behavior, the legal response to police abuse is
sufficiently sensitive to the institutional nature of the problem.
Enforcing the proper restraints on police power is a difficult problem in any society.
In the United States there is both a fear of governmental abuse and a tolerance of
repressive measures, the latter reflecting a belief that police excesses are necessary to
combat crime....
Acceptance of a certain level of police abuse is a predictable majoritarian response
to crime, upheaval and threats to the status quo. The true test of our society's
commitment to constitutional constraints is how government and the courts respond to
these systemic deviations from constitutional norms.
Rudovsky, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 466-67 (cited in note 5) (concluding that "the response of
government and the courts [to current police conduct] has been insufficient").
251. See Salken, 62 Temple L. Rev. at 254 (cited in note 4); Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at
417 (cited in note 3); Aro, Note, 70 B.U. L. Rev. at 119 (cited in note 4). As one leading
commentator has stated, "[a] paramount purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to prohibit
arbitrary searches and seizures as well as unjustified searches and seizures." Amsterdam, 58
Minn. L. Rev. at 417.
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concern in balancing the competing considerations that are inherent
in the Fourth Amendment is to ensure that a police officer may not
intrude arbitrarily on a person's reasonable expectation of privacy
solely at the officer's discretion.152  The Framers intended that the
government respect an individual's privacy interests unless the
government can express some "quantum of individualized suspicion"
that the person is involved in criminal conduct.25 Thus, the Fourth
Amendment acts as a restraint on police discretion to protect the
security and privacy of individuals against arbitrary intrusions.2 4
The problem courts and police face in attempting to use this
concern for the arbitrary abuse of discretion by police officers as a
guideline is that the standard is too vague for courts to apply and, to a
greater extent, for police to use for the myriad of discretionary
decisions they make daily.255 The Supreme Court has failed to devise
effective Fourth Amendment review standards regarding exceptions to
the warrant requirement, including investigatory stops. 25
Nevertheless, the Court has indicated that an increase in police
efficiency alone cannot justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment's
requirements. 25 7 The Court also has held that courts cannot excuse
252. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51 (stating that "[a] central concern has been to assure that an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the
unfettered discretion of officers in the field").
253. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976) (stating that before
police officials may invade an individual's privacy, they must have some quantum of
individualized suspicion).
254. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (stating that "except in those situations in
which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that
an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to
seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his
driver's license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment").
255. Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at 414-15 (cited in note 3).
256. Id. at 414. See Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1517 (noting that "the Court has never explicitly
defined the contours of the pretext doctrine"). See also Rudovsky, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at
467 (cited in note 5) (stating, "The true test of our society's commitment to constitutional
constraints is how government and the courts respond to these systemic deviations from
constitutional norms. If we examine current police conduct in light of this test, it is clear the
response of government and the courts has been insufficient."); Salken, 62 Temple L. Rev. at 240
(cited in note 4) (stating that "lilt is not clear whether the Supreme Court views searches or
seizures as illegal just because an officer's reasons for using a specific fourth amendment power
on a particular occasion are not the reasons advanced by courts for approving the doctrine which
allows such fourth amendment activity").
257. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (holding that a "murder scene
exception" to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement was inconsistent with that
amendment and that a warrantless search of an apartment is not permissible merely because a
homicide occurred there).
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Fourth Amendment demands in the name of law enforcement.2"
Therefore, although the Court has not defined the contours of the
pretext doctrine clearly, it has clarified that a justification greater
than crime-fighting efficiency alone is necessary to support an
investigatory stop.259 This requirement is consistent with the Court's
holding that at least a quantum of individualized suspicion-or
reasonable suspicion-is necessary to effectuate a valid investigatory
stop. 260
Conversely, an inquiry by courts into a police officer's
subjective intent and motivation in each case would be unproductive
because of the taxing effect it would have on judicial and law
enforcement resources and, arguably, because of the debilitating effect
this inquiry also may have on law enforcement activities. 2 6' First, a
test that requires courts to analyze an officer's subjective intent
logically would require an examination of the officer in court and
evaluation of any other evidence that would tend to show the officer's
state of mind at the time in question. That requirement alone would
make the subjective test burdensome even if courts could determine
the actual subjective intent of officers. As Professor LaFave has
noted, however, courts cannot determine consistently situations in
which the police had an ulterior motive.262  Furthermore, Professor
Amsterdam has indicated that police officers easily and undetectably
can fabricate a legitimate subjective purpose to do something that is
objectively lawful.263 Second, even if courts could determine a police
officer's subjective intent and if the police officer did not fabricate a
subjective purpose that comports with the legal rules, some courts find
that it makes no sense to perform this subjective inquiry to deter bad
intentions of an officer when officers ultimately do not manifest these
intentions in any objectively ascertainable Fourth Amendment
258. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62 (1967) (holding that a statute that permitted a
court to order electronic eavesdropping violated the Fourth Amendment because the statute was
too broad in its coverage).
259. See note 96 and accompanying text.
260. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882-83 (1975);
Ma rtinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560.
261. As Justice White succinctly stated, "sending state and federal courts on an expedition
into the minds of police officers would produce a grave and fruitless misallocation of judicial
resources." Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) (White, J., dissenting). See also
Rusher, 966 F.2d at 888 (Luttig, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) (noting that "[a]part from the substantial systemic costs in terms of judicial
and law enforcement resources that would be exacted by [a subjective] test, the ultimate effect of
the rule would be devastating for law enforcement").
262. LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 1.4(e) at 96 (cited in note 2).
263. Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at 436-37 (cited in note 3). Unfortunately, police do
fabricate reasons for taking actions. See Rudovsky, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 466 n.8 (cited in
note 5).
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violations.264 For reasons such as these, the Supreme Court set forth
the rule in Scott disregarding the underlying intent or motivation of
officers.265 However, the Court has not rejected, as some courts
contend, 2 6 the modified objective test.2 67
VI. A RECOMMENDED RESOLUTION OF THE SPLIT
Both the purely objective test and the modified objective test
have significant flaws.2 61 Notwithstanding the flaws of these tests,
however, this Note contends that the answer to this split of authority
among the circuits lies somewhere between the two tests. This Part
analyzes the proper criteria of a functional investigatory stop test and
then formulates the appropriate test to meet these criteria.
Specifically, this Part first identifies the primary flaws in the two
proffered tests while articulating the criteria that the appropriate test
should meet. Then, it lays the foundation for the test based on those
criteria and the Supreme Court's precedents. Next, it modifies the
foundation to create the test itself. Finally, it gives a brief overview of
the expected benefits and effects of that test.
A. The Criteria for a Meaningful Investigatory Stop Test
With the Fourth Amendment principles, competing policies,
existing case law, and relevant commentary in mind, this Note now
develops the foundational criteria that a meaningful investigatory
264. See, for example, Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
265. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978). See notes 110-13 and accompanying
text.
266. See text accompanying notes 42, 160, 168, 193. See also Salken, 62 Temple L. Rev. at
241 (cited in note 4) (stating that "Scott may... have closed the door on the pretext approach").
267. See notes 125-36 and accompanying text. Indeed, several recent cases suggest that the
Supreme Court has not abandoned the pretext doctrine. In Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367
(1987), the Court stated that "there was no showing that the police, who were following
standardized procedure , acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation." Id. at 372
(holding that a search of a van that was impounded after arrest of the driver for driving under the
influence of alcohol was valid). The Court's language suggests that a possibility remains for a
defendant to argue that a seizure or search is illegal if it is conducted in bad faith or for
investigatory purposes. Moreover, in New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), the Court stated
that "[tihe discovery of evidence of crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administrative
inspection does not render that search illegal or the administrative scheme suspect." Id. at 716
(holding that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred when police officers found several stolen
vehicles during an inspection of a New York City junkyard when this inspection was performed
pursuant to a statute that allowed them to do so without a warrant). The Court's statement again
suggests that if it had found pretextual conduct on the part of the police officers, a different
conclusion might have resulted.
268. See notes 274-78 and 285-87 and accompanying text.
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stop test must satisfy. The general criteria desired can be
summarized as: (1) Fourth Amendment principles, (2) free society
goals (that is, the reasonableness and predictability of law
enforcement procedures), (3) judicial resource limitations, (4) law
enforcement resource limitations, and (5) crime-fighting effectiveness.
A brief examination of these criteria is necessary to understand how
and why the criteria support the development and use of the test
recommended in this Part.
The first criterion to consider is the Fourth Amendment itself
and the values that underlie it. The Terry Court established that a
proper Fourth Amendment inquiry into whether an investigative
detention is valid will begin by asking whether the officer's actions
were justified when he first approached the defendant, and whether
the scope of the detention was reasonably related to the circumstances
that initially justified the interference.69 Thus, the first specific
substantive criterion is that the test should determine if the officer's
actions in performing the stop and any subsequent searches werejustified by the facts available to the officer at the time he made the
stop. 20 Moreover, the Court also has indicated that tests to determine
the validity of police conduct should balance the government's interest
in law enforcement against society's interests in being free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.27' Thus, the desired test also
must balance the government's interest in performing the stop against
society's interest in being free from the intrusion.272 Further,
regarding pretextual conduct, Professor LaFave has noted that the
"specter of the pretext arrest" with regard to minor traffic infractions
is a potential problem of such magnitude that a rule governing the
pervasive practice of police performing searches incident to arrest for
traffic violations must take the possibility of pretextual conduct into
account.23 Hence, the adopted test consistently and accurately should
be able to identify pretextiial or ulterior motives of police officers.
269. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). See notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
270. This analysis is inherent in the modified objective test because the question of whether
a reasonable officer would have performed the stop absent an invalid purpose looks at the facts
and circumstances available to the officer at the time he or she made the stop. See notes 35-37
and accompanying text.
271. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979) (stating, "The reasonableness of seizures that
are less intrusive than a traditional arrest... depends 'on a balance between the public interest
and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.'...
Consideration of the constitutionality of such seizures involves a weighing of the gravity of the
public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public
interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.") (quoting Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977)).
272. See note 51 and accompanying text.
273. See LaFave, 2 Search and Seizure § 5.2(e) at 458 (cited in note 2).
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Therefore, the Fourth Amendment alone requires that an appropriate
investigatory stop test embody (1) an analysis of the facts available to
the officer, (2) a balancing of the present interests, and (3) a
mechanism to discover pretextual activity. Notably, under this first
criterion, the purely objective test fails to qualify as a meaningful
investigatory stop test.
The purely objective test, as noted by various circuit courts
(including those adopting that test), substantially decreases the
chances that a court ever would discover a pretextual seizure. 274 The
Supreme Court clearly has held that the discretionary exercise of
police power may be unconstitutional in certain circumstances. 25
Because the discretionary exercise of police power may be
unconstitutional at times, courts are responsible for adopting a test
that permits finding these instances of unconstitutional conduct. The
purely objective test, however, which analyzes no more than whether
some available set of facts justifies a stop, would allow arbitrary
intrusions in thousands of everyday traffic stops because police officers
would have unfettered discretion as to whom they may stop.26 The
real hazard of the purely objective test is that officers may perform
intrusive stops at their discretion, even though they actually do not
have a valid reason to make a stop; that is, they may fabricate a rea-
son such as a traffic violation to justify their actions. Moreover, the
decided cases in this area clearly indicate that many circuits will
uphold a search incident to a traffic infraction arrest based on an
investigatory stop even in the face of clear evidence of an ulterior
motive.2 77 Hence, the purely objective test actually provides no Fourth
Amendment protection or regulation at all but merely creates an
easily attainable standard that police must meet to justify investiga-
tory stops. Thus, just as the Court has held that the constitutional
guarantee against unlawful searches and seizures could be reduced to
meaningless words if evidefice gained during investigatory arrests
made without warrant or probable cause was admissible based solely
on Miranda warnings, 27 1 so too the Fourth Amendment would be re-
274. See, for example, United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 1989) (adopting
the purely objective standard); United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1516 (10th Cir. 1988)
(adopting the modified objective standard).
275. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
276. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1516.
277. See, for example, United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987) (en
banc).
278. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602-03 (1975).
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duced to meaningless words if courts allow police to make
investigatory stops without reasonable suspicion.
The second general criterion that an adequate investigatory
stop test must meet is that it must be capable of protecting society's
needs and preferences for predictable law enforcement procedures.
One writer has commented that at the heart of the balancing test the
Supreme Court often applies in Fourth Amendment cases is the notion
that the Fourth Amendment serves societal needs and preferences.279
Citizens in a free society desire predictability regarding the discre-
tionary choices of police in performing searches and seizures.28° Con-
trolling police discretion to prevent arbitrary investigatory stops,
however, necessarily requires a court to make a judicial determination
that police action taken against persons in one investigatory stop
corresponds to police action taken with respect to other individuals
similarly situated but in different investigatory stops.21 Thus, the
investigatory stop test also should look at an officer's actions with
respect to standard police behavior, including whether that behavior
is influenced by written guidelines or usual police practices.282
279. Aro, Note, 70 B.U. L. Rev. at 122 n.70 (cited in note 4).
280. See LaFave, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at 449 (cited in note 5). See also Rudovsky, 27 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. at 467 (cited in note 5) (stating, "Enforcing the proper restraints on police power is a
difficult problem in any society. In the United States there is both a fear of governmental abuse
and a tolerance of repressive measures, the latter reflecting a belief that police excesses are
necessary to combat crime.... The true test of our society's commitment to constitutional
constraints is how ... the courts respond to... systemic deviations from constitutional norms.").
281. See LaFave, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at 449 (cited in note 5). Professor LaFave is a proponent
of a Fourth Amendment judicial review standard that would promote the development and use of
police procedures. For a general discussion of police procedures and the effects of judicially
requiring these procedures, see generally id. at 442. In that article, LaFave implies that police
organizations or other agencies should initiate and develop the procedures but the courts should
promote this development by judicially reviewing these procedures as cases and controversies
arise that require their review. See id: at 449-51. Professor LaFave states that rulemaking by
police departments would improve police performance by:
(1) 'enhanc[ing] the quality of police decisions" . . . [by focusing] attention on the fact that
policy is being made. .. [;J (2) . . . "ensurfing] the fair and equal treatment of citizens" ...
[by reducing] the influence of bias, [providing] uniform standards... and [serving] . .. to
guide and to control police behavior[;] (3) . .. "increas[ing] the visibility of police policy
decisions" [by] requir[ing] the departmental command structure to learn what officers in
the field are doing..." [; and] (4) ... "getting policemen consistently to obey and enforce
constitutional norms that guarantee the liberty of the citizen" because rules made by the
police are most likely to be obeyed by the police....
Id. at 451 (quoting Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at 423-28 (cited in note 3)).
282. The "usual practices" approach holds that "the proper basis of concern is not with why
the officer deviated from the usual practice in this case but simply that he did deviate. It is the
fact of the departure from the accepted way of handling such cases which makes the officer's
conduct arbitrary, and it is the arbitrariness which in this context constitutes the Fourth
Amendment violation." LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 1.4(e) at 94 (cited in note 2). The
Supreme Court emphatically endorsed a "standardized procedures" approach to automobile
inventory searches in Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (stting that "[i]n the present
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The remaining criteria that the test must embrace are more
functions of logic and reality than legal propositions to be analyzed in
depth. It is no secret that judicial and law enforcement resources are
limited. Neither courts nor police departments have the luxury of
dedicating a great deal of time or effort to a detailed investigation of
each investigatory stop case.2  Thus, the test should not be
overburdensome for the police to use in performing their everyday
duties or for the courts to use in reviewing the actions of the police.284
Finally, society, the courts, and the law enforcement agencies clearly
all desire effectiveness in the crime-fighting efforts of the police.
Hence, the test also should aid police in the performance of their
duties instead of impeding that performance.
The modified objective test is inherently flawed and does not
meet all these criteria necessary for a viable investigatory stop test.
Under the modified objective test, the government must prove that a
reasonable officer would have made the stop absent any invalid
purpose.285 This test requires a court to hold the stop unconstitutional
if a reasonable officer would not have performed the stop without the
improper motive. 28 Thus, when an officer makes a lawful traffic
violation stop that yields evidence of a crime, but the stop was an
investigatory stop that a reasonable officer would not have made, it is
unconstitutional; therefore, the court must suppress the evidence
despite the lawfulness of the actual stop. Pushed to its limits, then,
the modified objective test could require suppression of evidence even
case. ... there was no showing that the police, who were following standardized procedures, acted
in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation").
Nevertheless, the Trigg court criticized the usual practices approach for not truly responding
to the pretextual seizure problem: "Under a 'usual practices' standard an arrest made for an
improper reason will be valid so long as the decision to arrest for a particular offense is not a
departure from the norm while an arrest made for proper reasons will be invalid if the decision to
arrest for the particular offense is a departure from the norm." United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d
1037, 1041 (7th Cir. 1989). The Trigg court failed to understand the application of the usual
practices approach. Like written procedures, the fact that usual practices exist simply should
create a presumption of validity that the officer's actions were appropriate because the reasonable
officer would have taken the usual practices or followed the written guidelines. The usual
practices approach does not rule out the possibility that a court still may find that an improper
seizure was arbitrary even though conducted in accordance with usual practices. Likewise, a
court still could find a seizure proper even though not conducted in accordance with usual
practices if the seizure was not arbitrary. See LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 1.4(e) at 94 (cited
in note 2).
283. See note 261 and accompanying text.
284. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that a goal of judicial review is to provide "'[a]
single familiar standard" to guide police officers in their practices implicating the Fourth
Amendment. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987) (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454, 458 (1981)) (brackets in original).
285. See text accompanying notes 35 and 107-08.
286. See United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 887 (4th Cir. 1992) (Luttig, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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in situations in which a police officer had no pretextual motive. 87
Thus, the modified objective test also fails to produce a desirable
result. With the criteria an investigatory stop test should meet, as
well as the flaws of both the modified objective and purely objective
tests, in mind, the next subpart lays the foundation for a
recommended investigatory stop test.
B. The Scott Foundation
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has laid a foundation that
incorporates many of the necessary criteria. In Scott v. United
States,28 the Court held that simply because an officer's state of mind
does not provide the legal justification for the officer's action, the law
should not invalidate the action as long as the objectively viewed
circumstances justify that action.2 9 The Court, while adopting this
standard, nevertheless tempered its holding by finding that because of
the ad hoc nature of a determination of reasonableness, no inflexible
rule of law can exist that will apply to every case. 290 This standard,
with the Court's caveat, incorporates a number of the desired test's
criteria.
The Scott standard necessarily includes an evaluation of the
officer's action with regard to the facts and circumstances facing the
officer at the time of the stop. That requirement limits the time frame
and information that a court must review and also limits the amount
of information police officers must consider when making a stop.291
Moreover, that standard incorporates the requirement that the test
should determine if the officer's action was justified by the facts avail-
able to the officer at the time of the stop.2 92 Further, this standard
embraces the criterion that the test should view an officer's actions
287. See id. Judge Luttig uses the following example to illustrate this point:
[I]f after stopping a vehicle for exceeding the authorized speed limit by five miles per hour
or for driving with license plates that expired the previous day, an officer discovers a
kilogram of cocaine and an assault weapon used in a heinous murder, both the drugs and
the weapon would be suppressed as the fruits of an unconstitutional stop unless the
officer who effected the stop establishes by affirmative evidence that a 'reasonable officer'
also would have stopped the vehicle.
Id. (emphasis in original).
288. 436 U.S. 128 (1978). See also notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
289. Scott, 436 U.S. at 138.
290. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
291. Even with these limiting effects, courts are also free to consider an officer's experience
and expertise in determining the reasonableness of a stop. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)
(stating that "in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due
weight must be given ... to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from
the facts in light of his experience").
292. See notes 269-70 and accompanying text.
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with regard to standard police behavior, including whether that
behavior is influenced by written guidelines or usual police practices,
because an evaluation of the officer's action at the time of the stop also
would include an analysis of the customary practices of the police or
written guidance available to the officer.2 3 Finally, a requirement
that the court should evaluate the officer's actions with respect to the
facts and circumstances then available to him does not hinder that
officer's crime-fighting effectiveness because no burdensome demand
is placed on him; the requirement affects the procedures of the
reviewing court, not the officer's actions.
Even though the Scott language is a useful foundation on
which to build, it does not address a few of the key concerns of the
pretextual stop issue; therefore, forming a test requires refinements of
the Scott standard. Specifically, one key omission in the Scott stan-
dard is that it does not promote the values underlying the Fourth
Amendment because it fails to balance the government's interests
against society's interests as the Fourth Amendment inherently di-
rects. 294 Another key omission in the Scott standard is that it does not
differentiate between those objective elements that are dispositive in
determining whether a pretextual investigatory stop is unconstitu-
tional.95 Finally, the Scott standard does not compare similar investi-
gatory stops to ensure that treatment of one person corresponds to the
treatment of all individuals similarly situated.2 96 These omissions
require a modification of the Scott standard that 'will incorporate all
necessary criteria into the test.
C. The Test
The appropriate investigatory stop test is actually a combina-
tion, to a limited extent, of the purely objective test, the modified
objective test, and the police- rule-making approach espoused by Pro-
fessor LaFave.2 97 The test essentially is composed of two primary
inquiries, but a court will address the second inquiry only if the
government fails to carry its burden in the first inquiry. Additionally,
courts can apply" the test consistent with the good faith doctrine. 298
293. See notes 273 and 281-82 and accompanying text.
294. See notes 51 and 271 and accompanying text.
295. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988).
296. See text accompanying notes 281-82.
297. See notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
298. Under the good faith doctrine, the exclusionary rule does not apply when an officer's
good faith belief that a defective warrant was valid was objectively reasonable. See Scott, 436
U.S. at 139 n.13; United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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For ease of understanding and discussion, this Note divides the test
into its component parts.
Part One. A court must ask whether the officer conducted the
stop within the bounds of a valid police procedure.299 If so, the stop is
presumptively valid but the defendant may rebut the presumption.
Balancing the government's interest against society's interest is
inherent in this question because this balance sets the bounds of a
valid police procedure. If the police organization has developed and
implemented written guidelines or usual practices regarding
investigatory stops, and those guidelines reasonably reflect society's
interests in both effective crime fighting and freedom from
unreasonable seizures, then courts should give a presumption of
constitutionality to those guidelines or practices. Although this part of
the test is similar to the purely objective test, it differs distinctly from
that test because this analysis considers whether the officer conducted
the stop within the jurisdiction's statutory, regulatory, or ordinance
requirements or the police department's written guidelines or usual
practices. This distinction is important because the test then
compares the facts of the actual stop with the requirements,
guidelines, or practices and does not analyze whether the officer could
have made the stop for any valid reason. If (1) the government does
not have a valid police procedure, (2) the defendant overcomes the
presumption of validity of the investigatory stop by showing that
society's interests outweigh the government's, or (3) the court finds
that the stop was actually arbitrary or improper notwithstanding an
officer's use of a valid procedure; only then does the test require the
court to address the second part of the test.
Part Two. If no valid police procedure is in place, and the court
finds the police procedure invalid because society's interest in freedom
from unreasonable seizure outweighs the government's interest in the
scope of the procedure, or the court finds that the stop was arbitrary
or improper even though conducted in accordance with a valid
procedure, then the court should apply the second part of the test-the
modified objective test. Under this part, the court analyzes whether a
299. The definition of a "valid police procedure" is intended to be broad. The term would
include any written procedures, guidelines, policy statements, or principles of a law enforcement
organization, as well as any law that grants the officer the authority to perform the stop. See, for
example, 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), the statute authorizing vessel stops in United States v. Villamonte-
Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 585 (1983) (authorizing customs officers to board any vessel at any time
and any place in the United States or its territorial waters to examine the vessel's manifest and
other documents). Moreover, valid police procedures also would include the usual practices of a
police organization that are well established within the police unit such that the practice is
common knowledge. See note 282.
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reasonable officer would have performed the investigatory stop under
the same circumstances in the absence of any invalid pretextual
purpose.3 ° This analysis requires the court to examine the decision a
reasonable officer would have made based on all information known
by the officers who made the stop, excluding any information that
formed the pretextual motive to stop the automobile. If the court
finds the reasonable officer would have made the stop as well, then
the stop was reasonable and is constitutional. If a reasonable officer
would not have made the stop, however, then the court should find the
stop invalid unless the good faith doctrine applies.
If the stop fails both the valid police procedure portion of the
test and the modified objective portion of the test, then it would be
unconstitutional on Fourth Amendment grounds unless the good faith
doctrine 30' saves the officer's action. A court applying the good faith
doctrine may decide whether to exclude the evidence obtained from
the unlawful seizure if it finds that the officer had a good faith belief
that a defective warrant was valid and this belief was objectively
reasonable. 30 2 Note though that if a reasonable officer would not have
made the stop in the absence of an invalid purpose, it is unlikely that
a magistrate would have issued even a defective warrant.
D. Benefits and Effects of the Test
This subpart outlines the benefits that flow from the recom-
mended test and analyzes a number of the factual situations pre-
sented in circuit court cases. It first lists the benefits expected from
the test and then analyzes the expected effects.
Benefit Number One: The primary benefit of this test is that it
preserves the necessary pretext doctrine, thereby permitting an in-
quiry into the reasonableness of an officer's action without requiring
analysis of the officer's subjective intent. Real Fourth Amendment
protections are available to society through this test. It embraces the
balancing inherent in the Fourth Amendment because in the first part
of the test, the court balances the government's interests against soci-
ety's interests. Also, a court then may determine if the action was
reasonable under the reasonable officer standard. Together, the two
parts of the test preserve the pretext doctrine.
300. United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 1986).
301. See note 298.
302. See Scott, 436 U.S. at 139 n.13; Leon, 468 U.S. at 897.
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Benefit Number Two: The test permits a court to differentiate
between legal and fabricated pretexts3° because the court simply may
apply the test to a legal pretext and, if warranted, find the stop valid.
Yet, if a court finds that the officer fabricated the purpose to stop,
then the stop would fail both the first and second parts of the test,
rendering it unconstitutional. The stop would fail the first part of the
test because a finding of a fabricated purpose necessarily would mean
that the officer followed no valid police procedure when she made the
stop.30 4 Likewise, the stop would fail the second part of the test be-
cause no reasonable officer would fabricate a reason to perform an
investigatory stop.
Benefit Number Three: Application of the test requires only
limited judicial resources because in a large number of cases, only the
first part of the test will be necessary because of the broad definition
of valid police procedures.30 Even if the second part is necessary, how-
ever, an evaluation of what a reasonable officer would do is not overly
taxing on a court as proven by the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits in
their application of the modified objective test.3°6
Benefit Number Four: Police departments can easily
understand and apply the test. Therefore, vast numbers of law
enforcement resources are not required, and crime-fighting effec-
tiveness is aided because the police will have a clear indication of
when courts will uphold their conduct in performing investigatory
stops. Specifically, the test is capable of becoming a single, familiar
standard to guide police officers.307  Moreover, the test promotes
initiation and production of police procedures because police depart-
ments may ensure the presumption of constitutionality of their stops
only if they have established written guidelines or adhere to usual
practices.
Benefit Number Five: Finally, even if a police department fails
the first and second parts of the test, the government still may admit
evidence if the good faith doctrine is applicable. That is, the test does
not penalize officers who rely, in good faith, on a defective warrant.
Applying the test to a few of the factual situations present in
some of the circuit court cases discussed in Part IV of this Note and to
the hypothetical situations presented by both Judge Luttig in
303. See notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
304. See notes 60 and 299.
305. See note 299.
306. See, for example, United States v. Horn, 970 F.2d 728 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Valdez, 931 F.2d 1448 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Corral, 899 F.2d 991 (10th Cir. 1990).
307. See note 284 and accompanying text.
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Rusher °8 and Judge Higginbotham in Causey3°* demonstrates the
effects of the recommended test. These analyses show that the test
embodies all the requirements mandated by the Supreme Court yet
embraces the desired criteria. Finally, for purposes of this analysis,
this Note refers to the developed test as the "functional test."
Application of the functional test to Cummins likely would
yield the same result. In Cummins, the officer stopped the defendant
because of suspicious behavior exhibited by the defendant and his
passenger.310 The reason given for the stop was the defendant's failure
to signal before making a right turn. Applying the functional test, the
government likely would pass the first part of the test because giving
a signal to make a turn probably is required by statute or ordinance;
therefore, the stop was made within the bounds of the statute or
ordinance that most likely permits officers to stop vehicles violating
this law. Because the first part of the test would be satisfied, a
presumption of constitutionality would attach to the officer's action.
The defendant could rebut this presumption only with clear and
convincing evidence that the stop was unreasonable, which is unlikely
based on these facts. Thus, the practical result of the test is that if a
police department takes action in accordance with statutes,
regulations, ordinances, or police procedures in making an investiga-
tory stop, a court likely would not apply the second part of the
functional test because the first part was met.
The test applies to Judge Luttig's hypothetical as well. He was
concerned that if a reasonable officer would not have performed an
investigatory stop of an automobile exceeding the speed limit by five
miles per hour or of an automobile whose license plate was one day
overdue for renewal, then the modified objective test would require
suppression of evidence obtained in the investigatory stops of those
vehicles. 311 Under the functional test, however, the stop likely will
pass the first part of the test because statutes or ordinances usually
regulate speed limits or driving with expired license plates. Thus, a
presumption of validity would attach to the officer's action. If,
however, the facts were so egregious that a defendant could show that
the actions of the police officer were unreasonable, then the defendant
could rebut the presumption. Only then must the court perform the
second part of the test, asking if a reasonable officer would have
308. United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 887 (4th Cir. 1992) (Luttig, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). See also note 217.
309. United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1185-86 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc)
(Higginbothan, J., concurring).
310. See note 197.
311. Rusher, 966 F.2d at 887 (Luttig, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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stopped the slightly speeding automobile or the automobile with
recently expired license plates.
In Rusher, the defendant argued that the officer's stop of his
truck was unconstitutional because the stated reasons for the
stop-seat belt violations and a homemade license plate-were not the
true reasons the officer made the stop; the true reason, the defendant
argued, was to investigate for drugs. 312 Under the functional test, once
again, the government would receive a presumption of validity be-
cause both the seat belt violations and the license plate violation
generally are regulated by statute, ordinance, or regulation. Any
suspicions the officer developed after the stop, leading him to search
the vehicle, may be vulnerable to attack by the defendant, but the
stop itself would be presumed valid. The court, therefore, likely would
find the officer's conduct in performing the stop to be a reasonable
Fourth Amendment seizure unless the defendant could rebut the
presumption; thus, the court would have no need to perform the
second part of the test.
In some instances, however, a court must proceed to the second
part of the test. For example, under the functional test, the Trigg
court probably would have come to a different conclusion. In Trigg, an
officer arrested the defendant, rather than issuing him a citation, for
the minor traffic violation of driving on a suspended license. 313 The
officer's testimony that the local police department left to the individ-
ual officer's discretion the decision to arrest an individual or to issue a
traffic citation for driving on a suspended license would be damaging
to the government under the first part of the functional test.314 The
government would fail the first part of the test because the officer
would not have performed the arrest in accordance with a valid police
procedure. 3' 5 Hence, the presumption of validity would not attach to
the officer's conduct, and the burden would then shift to the govern-
ment to show that a reasonable officer who did not know that the
defendant may have been involved in drug activity would have ar-
rested the defendant under the same circumstances.31 6 If the court
found that a reasonable officer simply would have issued a citation for
driving with a suspended license, then the seizure would fail the
functional test and violate the Fourth Amendment.317 Thus, this test
312. See note 217 and accompanying text.
313. See note 167.
314. See id.
315. See note 299 and accompanying text.
316. See text accompanying note 300.
317. The seizure would be unconstitutional unless the good faith doctrine saves the officer's
action from violation of the Fourth Amendment. Under the good faith doctrine, the exclusionary
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requires no subjective inquiry into the officer's intent, yet does not
diminish the chances of discovering pretextual activity, as feared by
the Trigg majority.31a If the court were to find that a reasonable offi-
cer would have arrested the defendant, however, the arrest would
pass the second part of the test and would be a valid Fourth
Amendment seizure.
The final situation analyzed is Judge Higginbotham's
hypothetical situation in which a police department stockpiles traffic
violation warrants, allowing officers later to arrest an individual
whom it desires to interrogate by retrieving an arrest warrant from
the stockpile.319 Under the functional test, even though a statute or
ordinance giving the police department the authority to arrest
individuals on outstanding arrest warrants likely would be in effect,
the first part of the test allows the court to balance society's interests
against the government's interests. Judge Higginbotham's
hypothetical situation provides a classic example of when a court
should balance those interests. A court performing this balancing to
determine whether a worthy governmental interest or policy supports
the statute or ordinance should find that society's interests outweigh
the government's interests in this situation, invalidating the police
practice of stockpiling arrest warrants as an unconstitutional abuse of
their authority. Thus, the balancing inherent in Fourth Amendment
analysis carries over into both the first and second parts of the test,
permitting the court first to balance the reasonableness of a statute,
regulation, procedure, or usual practice against society's interests
when applying the first part of the test and then to balance the
reasonableness of an officer's action against society's interests if it
reaches the second part of the test.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Note demonstrates that the pretext doctrine is neither
incompatible with existing Fourth Amendment doctrine nor an empty
doctrine, as some suggest. Rather, because of the confusion among
the circuit courts, the Supreme Court must reaffirm and clarify the
doctrine, particularly in the area of investigatory seizures, which
include investigatory stops. Specifically, this Note offers a resolution
rule does not apply when an officer's good faith belief that a defective warrant was valid is
objectively reasonable. See Scott, 436 U.S. at 139 n.13; Leon, 468 U.S. at 897; notes 298 and 302
and accompanying text.
318. See Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1040. See also text accompanying note 169.
319. See Causey, 834 F.2d at 1185-86 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
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to the deep and disturbing division among the circuits regarding the
standard for determining if an investigatory seizure was pretextual.
This Note has addressed the confusion surrounding the investigatory
stop doctrine by outlining the state of the current law and
recommending a solution that not only incorporates the concerns the
Framers drafted into the Fourth Amendment but also comports with
the realities of law enforcement and judicial review. This Note,
therefore, recommends that courts, including the Supreme Court,
recognize the detrimental divisiveness among the circuit courts and
develop an appropriate investigatory stop test that preserves the
meaningful interests the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.
Andrew J. Pulliam

